Pakistan’s political landscape is quite unique in terms of hosting a set of ever-competing politicians, judgmental judges, mighty military, rational bureaucracy, corporate media and a divided and increasingly intolerant society. From a vendor selling used and smuggled jackets on the outskirts of Aabpara Market to a western-educated professional, everybody loves to give their opinion when it comes to the politics of Pakistan. For example, Mr N will argue that Nawaz Sharif and company have survived since they have taken the military top brass into confidence in the wake of the August/September political agitation launched by Imran Khan and Dr Qadri. Ms I, being pro-Imran and pro-revolution, without understanding the comparative origins and consequences of world revolutions, will jump in to make a case for her party being dishonestly deprived of the right to form a legitimate government at the Centre. Her friend, Ms J, will go a step further by emotionally dubbing the existing political system as undemocratic, corrupt and feudal. Paradoxically, Ms J will register her political decree over a warm cup of latté in an elite setting within urban Pakistan. With a huge class difference and perspective, Ms Q, a diehard fan of Dr Qadri, sees another Pakistan in the making since she staunchly believes in what her pir envisions. Contrary to the abovementioned political voices, Mr M, being pro-religion, will lambast democracy, feudalism, industrialism, feminism, etc, for being anti-Islam. In his view, all solutions to Pakistan’s problems and those of the ummah lie solely in Islam. Moreover, he will even criticise leaders like Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Sirajul Haq for using religion as an instrument for political purposes. On the other hand, however, a preacher of regional or zonal ethnicity, while sipping tea at a kiosk in the southwest, if not north, of the country will make a case in favour of provincial and regional autonomy. His — since women are largely excluded from local political activity and discourse — vision of (local) politics is essentiality anti-federation and, at times, anti-Punjab. He and his comrades are least bothered about what happens in Lahore or Islamabad. Indeed, most such nationalists view Imran Khan and Qadri as serving the cause of Punjab, the federation, feudalism and capitalism. Nevertheless, there still exits an extremely minute minority, if I can term it so, that is quite scattered socio-economically and demographically, and views Pakistan’s politics in general, and November 30 in particular, from very different theoretical perspectives ranging from structuralism to path dependency to rational choice. Importantly, however, such perspectives do rely on the social, economic and political data that is originally produced by Mr M, Ms Q, I or J. Hence, at the broader level of ensconcing theory with data, the relevance of social and political opinions at the local/regional level do matter and, therefore, they should not be silenced without their due right. In addition, each of these conceptualisations, i.e. realist, structuralist, feminist, etc, are important for understanding and explaining politics anywhere in the world. In the contemporary context of Pakistan, for instance, a structuralist would argue that no meaningful change has happened or will happen in this country on November 30 given the absence of any significant modification in the structural relations between politics, the economy and society. Similarly, an exponent of path dependency would re-emphasise the relevance of a set path of authoritarianism, of all kinds, that has beset Pakistan historically. A realist may attempt to comprehend Pakistan’s domestic politics from the prism of international balance of power in the wake of shifting strategic paradigms in the Middle East, i.e. the emerging US-Iran rapprochement and the US role in South Asia, i.e. the US’s decision to extend its combat role till 2015. The proponent of rational choice, on the other hand, would assume politicians, civil and military bureaucracies, judiciary, media and (civil) society as actors with a clear conception of largely material interests. This becomes the inherent basis for their choice formation that guides their actions. Since this author ontologically believes in the comparative explanatory potential of rational choice theory, the following is an attempt to outline a rational scenario of politics and the state in Pakistan on November 30. To begin with, owing to the recent ploy on the part of the prime minister resorting to the army to act as arbitrator to settle the political dispute between himself, Imran Khan and Dr Qadri, the military has been able to further consolidate its position within the civil-military relations matrix. Hence, rationally, the military would not have wished for another spree of political agitation. Moreover, if rationality is a guide, the GHQ is not expected to side with Mr Khan on that day since its involvement directly in politics would make the military a party of the protestors. If that is not the case, this would imply the political match is basically to be played between the Sharif-led government and the Khan-led protesters. Now, as a believer in democratic theory, I would be surprised if Punjab and the federal government attempt to violate the right of association and protestation by the PTI. Even their demand to make D-Chowk the venue for the protest should be met. If the government disrupts the protesters as a policy, this, I am afraid, could provide the PTI a reason to actually put pressure on the former with an attempt to probably enter parliament’s premises. Moreover, killings, God forbid, of say around 20 or so PTI protesters, by any means, would cause serious problems of law and order. If this happens and lingers on with a militant strategy by Mr Khan to dislodge the existing political setup, the media-led public pressure would be a cause for concern for the government, the military and, most importantly, the judiciary. In such a scenario, the military would rely on the judiciary to observe and judge. If the latter paves the way for a judiciary-guided technocratic setup, this would be detrimental to institutional interests in the short to long run. Moreover, it would also bring pro-PML-N and pro-democracy elements in the opposition to the PTI and the technocrats, with a likelihood of higher intensity for political violence. On the other hand, if the PTI is allowed to protest at its desired destination and if it stays peaceful, its fate would not be any different. Instead, the government would survive another day, with November 30 making no difference at all for the PTI and the like. The writer is a DAAD fellow and is the author of Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan. He works as an assistant professor at Iqra University, Islamabad and tweets @ ejazbhatty