A deal can be credible, workable and lasting if both the signatory parties interpret it as being in their benefit and claim to have gained more than they have lost. This is true about the nuclear deal that has taken place between Iran and six major world powers in Vienna, Austria, under the auspices of the UN, on July 14, 2015. The deal will prevent Iran from making a nuclear bomb by accepting long-term restrictions on its nuclear programme. That is, in its nuclear capabilities, Iran will not cross a certain threshold (in terms of the number of centrifuges and the density of uranium) considered necessary to make a nuclear bomb. On the other hand, the deal will make the UN, European Union (EU) and the US lift the various types of sanctions imposed on Iran. In short, Iran has been denied a nuclear bomb (at least for the immediate future), but has been given access to international financial and material progress.
From a different perspective, whereas Iran will be able to retrieve its billions of dollars stashed (as frozen funds) in the banks of western countries as a result of this deal, the six major world powers (the US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) will secure the sanctity of the Strait of Hormuz to get a steady and cheap supply of oil from the Gulf. In the same vein, whereas Iran will have to wait for almost a year to harvest the financial gains of the deal, the six major world powers will reap the benefits of the lower cost of oil perhaps immediately. Nevertheless, this is rightly called a constructive engagement, which is, in this case, a product of the Track-II diplomacy initiated by US President Barack Obama almost two years ago. In total, it took 10 years of diplomatic wrangling by various countries to reach the deal.
The deal is also the product of the idea that the world is interconnected and that no country, even if it has substantial resources, can survive alone. Any country, whether rich or poor, is dependent on others for survival, though the rate of dependence may differ amongst countries. The Iranians, who were keen to end their isolation, realised this point and elected Hassan Rouhani as their president almost two years ago to achieve this goal. On the contrary, there are people in Pakistan who keep peddling their views, dogmas and doctrines that risk international isolation for Pakistan — be it the point of debt servicing or taking the Pakistani Mumbai attackers to task. Hardly anyone has realised that the Mumbai attack has silenced the groups in India that advocated peace with Pakistan. Furthermore, Track-II diplomacy between Pakistan and India is not progressing because it depends upon the accountability of the Mumbai attackers. Ostensibly, the issue of terrorism has taken precedence over the Kashmir issue. The joint communiqué issued recently in Ufa, Russia between Pakistan and India is a testament to this fact.
Pakistan sees two major opportunities in the conclusion of the deal. Firstly, Pakistan will meet its energy demands by either getting gas directly from Iran through the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project or by buying oil from the Middle East at a lower price than before because of the deal. Secondly, Pakistan will seek the help of Iran to stabilise the regime of President Ashraf Ghani in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Pakistan has to weigh whether Iran is now closer to Pakistan or to India. If the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s can be considered the pinnacle of Pak-Iran bilateral relations, when Iran unequivocally supported Pakistan financially and militarily at the expense of India, then the 1980s and 1990s can be considered the nadir of Pak-Iran bilateral relations, when sectarian trends promoted by sectarian organisations jeopardised bilateral relations and brought Pakistan closer to Saudi Arabia at the expense of Iran.
In 1996, the recognition of the Taliban government in Kabul by Pakistan and the denunciation of the same by Iran reflected the explicit regional contention emerging between Pakistan and Iran. The same development brought Iran and India closer to each other. Apparently, the Iran of today is nearer to India than to Pakistan. The trade interests of Iran and India in Central Asia converge. The embodiment of that convergence is the development of Chahbahar port in the Iranian part of Balochistan and a motorway from the port to the middle of Afghanistan, both by India. After the sanctions on Iran are lifted, India will find itself in a better position than Pakistan to enhance and diversify its volume of trade with Iran. This also means that the corresponding interests of both Iran and India in the future of Afghanistan may offer a challenge to Pakistan. India can also make a choice between having a gas pipeline or a land transit route through Pakistan despite the prevalent bitterness between the two countries.
Being plagued by the energy crisis that has rocked its economy badly and the Taliban crisis that has shaken its society gravely for almost a decade, Pakistan cannot underrate the importance of Iran. However, the major threat to the hopes of stability comes from the monster of sectarianism, which has be home-promoted as a legacy of the socio-political developments of the 1980s in Pakistan or which can be foreign-promoted to keep Pakistan aloof of its south western neighbour, Iran. To get the benefits of Iran’s energy resources and trade potential, Pakistan has to check the sectarian trends in its society. In short, it seems that in this new phase of Pak-Iran relations, Pakistan has several expectations from Iran. However, it is obvious that in this phase, Pakistan may find Iran to be more vocal and active than before on sectarian killings in Pakistan, the incidents shaping the future of Afghanistan and the incidents affecting Pak-India relations.
The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at [email protected]