One thing that has come to the fore in recent months is that the establishment, even in its transformed role, remains the most significant power player in Pakistan. The actions and strategies of key political players need to accommodate the establishment’s considerations and thinking. And yet there seems to be little exercise going on into understanding the establishment’s priorities. I, for one, have no direct access to the thinking of Pakistan’s security establishment. However, based on signs and signals and from what one hears from people consulted by the security establishment, one can try to piece together the establishment’s mindset. So, let us try. The agenda that seems to be at the top of the establishment’s thinking is not Afghanistan but India. There is a feeling that, post-US withdrawal, India will try to increase its footprint in Afghanistan. This, coupled with the Modi government’s efforts to change the constitutional status of Kashmir, increases the risk of confrontation with India. There is also a feeling that as a result of the war on terror and successive efforts of rapprochement with India, Pakistan’s principled position on Kashmir has been compromised on international forums. So, on this front, the establishment’s focus will be on curtailing Indian influence in Afghanistan and bringing to the fore the Kashmir issue. Owing to the actions of the Modi government and Pakistan’s security concerns, efforts like trade talks can take a backseat for now. Next, of course, is Afghanistan and the broader question of fighting against Islamic militancy. In recent months, the army has embarked on a very decisive approach of eradicating militant networks, something that has been acknowledged by the Pentagon. Ever since the start of the war on terror, for the first time elements within the Haqqani network have been targeted as well. It seems a consequence of years of thinking that the menace of extremist militancy, nurtured in part by Pakistan’s security establishment, has become too big a monster that now threatens the state and its institutions. Linked to militancy is Afghanistan, where the security establishment feels comfortable that it has either nurtured ties with elements previously hostile to Pakistan or has neutralised them. For the first time, the Afghan government is interested in letting Pakistan train its army. During the recent visit, defying protocol, the president of Afghanistan visited the General Headquarters (GHQ). The security establishment also feels comfortable on the Afghan front because it has opened up channels with the geographical neighbours of Afghanistan to reach mutual interest based equilibrium in Afghanistan. In the absence of any verifiable information, one can only guess that this opening up of channels has the backing of Washington as well, as the idea had, in the past, been floated by many US policy analysts, including Henry Kissinger. So, an army more confident of the new equilibrium in Afghanistan and wary of potential threats posed by militants is more focused on going after the terrorists. On that front, one should not be surprised if an operation is launched in Punjab in the coming weeks or months. Linked to the militancy issue is the threat of Islamic State (IS). In my opinion, IS does not pose any direct threat to Pakistan. However, the vulnerabilities it can cause in the Middle East can give the conflict sectarian or ideological dimensions, which can have serious repercussions for Pakistan. It seems the security establishment understands these threats but, for now, has limited plans to deal with the fallout. At some point, Pakistan will have to have a broader engagement in the Middle East to gain the best odds of combating any fallout. Worst case scenario will be if IS starts targeting Saudi Arabia and, there too, Hijaz. With the record of desecrations of holy sites, IS’s activities in Hijaz can spark a global crisis, the shocks of which will be intensely felt in Pakistan. On IS, the establishment realises it has a problem but for now the US seem to be the only one it is engaging with on the issue. In the near future, I will not be surprised if Pakistan commits troops in the fight against IS. Whether this is a war Pakistan should be part of or not requires intense deliberations. Apart from these geopolitical issues, there is a broader economic issue that concerns the establishment. The economy of Pakistan has to open up. Transferring control of natural resources to the private sector (most of which will have foreign investments involved) and letting go of a large chunk of control over channelling economic resources will be very hard for an establishment that has been known to keep the country in its grip. This fear may be part of the reason economic liberalisation has been slow in Pakistan. The establishment realises the potential of the threat capital flow poses to the state but does not seem to have a plan to counter those threats. In a globally integrated world, capital flow is needed for survival and growth. This is one area of the national security policy the establishment needs to deliberate on and innovate in. The above-mentioned concerns are not totally baseless. On the other hand, the establishment has erred a great deal in the past, which has created mammoth troubles for the nation. The future, however, lies in dealing with these concerns in an equitable way between the key stakeholders of the country. Only through a collaborative effort can the nation sail out of these troubled waters. The establishment will need to engage with genuine political forces in the country and give them equity in the solution. My way or the highway attitude has not worked in a heterogeneous society like Pakistan and will not work in the future as well. These threats can suck us into the abyss but beyond them is the promise of a modern, progressive Pakistan. May we see the light! The author can be reached on twitter at @aalimalik