By May 1988, the first of the Soviet troops started leaving Afghanistan; the Cold War was reaching an end and the iron curtain was slowly melting away. President Reagan visited the USSR in May 1988. While on a tour of Red Square, a reporter asked him if he still considered the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire’. Reagan replied, “No,” and continued, “I was talking about another time, another era.” The US abandoned Afghanistan, relegating it to the status of a distant, irrelevant country. By 1992, the US stopped all financial and material support to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Similarly, in the same year, the USSR also ceased financial support to Najibullah’s government, leading to its collapse. Najibullah took refuge in the UN compound in Kabul. In 1996, the Taliban seized him from the same compound and brutally killed him. From 1992 onwards, the US and the erstwhile USSR watched the consequent civil strife from the sidelines. The once seemingly strong Cold War alliances were now of no interest to the US. Instead, some alliances like the one with nuclear-capable Pakistan were now viewed as a liability. The US, on the face of it, departed Afghanistan thinking itself to be a victor. Reagan, at the end of his presidential term, told General Colin Powell, “The world is quiet today.” History was to shortly prove otherwise as there was to be ‘no exit’ for the US from Afghanistan. A far bigger tragedy awaited it in the next few years in the shape of the war on terror commencing in 2001. The USSR and US were in such haste to leave Afghanistan that no efforts were made for a transition of power to any credible or stable government. Moreover, the US left behind large quantities of arms mostly in the hands of militias over whom the US no longer exercised any influence. In the years to come, these weapons would play a key role in destabilising the region. Later events were to show that the occupation of Afghanistan by the USSR in 1979 was a flawed policy but equally flawed was the US strategy to arm and finance groups to resist the Soviet occupation, and then abandon the region. Pakistan was the frontline state in the long Soviet Afghan war and suffered from the following civil strife in Afghanistan. From the initial years onwards, Pakistan did not publically admit the actual level of its involvement in Afghanistan. People did not have a clear idea of the situation in Afghanistan. In the confusion there was a search for explanations for the insurmountable problems that started appearing. While the US was making significant military gains in Afghanistan onwards 1979, using our soil and infrastructure, for us the war started bringing many problems for which we did not have sufficient resources. Three million Afghan refugees had to be accommodated by the already burdened economy. In addition, there were problems emanating from narcotics, gun running and illegal border crossing of economic goods. In 1979, we failed to realise that getting involved in a war, even a proxy war, would create problems altering the social and economic variables of the country. There were some voices in the 1980s that articulated that the causes of our emerging social and economic problems were due to our involvement in the Afghan war and there is a need to disengage ourselves, that Pakistan could not afford to share the burden of this war. As we were in the midst of grappling with the problems created by the Soviet Afghan war, we again got ourselves involved in Afghanistan in the war on terror in 2001. Pakistan joined the US-led alliance created for the dismemberment of al Qaeda and replacing the Taliban government. As in 1979, Pakistan was to allow use of its infrastructure network, air corridors for military aircraft and air bases. The US was to pay for these facilities from a coalition support fund. It was then partially a commercial agreement. In 1979, and again in 2001, there was no open public debate on involving ourselves in these wars; people were just informed but never consulted on an issue that was to have a transformative impact on society. It is quite possible that under democratic governments Pakistan would have chosen a different path, avoiding some of the consequences of the strife in Afghanistan. The US and its allies have been in Afghanistan for more than 12 years now, with uncertain results. The US and NATO allies want to exit Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and, unlike 1979, this time a large number of US and NATO troops will need to be evacuated under hostile conditions. There is apprehension that the Taliban will resist a peaceful withdrawal of the last of the US troops. The announced drawdown is in December 2014, with a remote possibility of leaving behind a few thousand residual US anti-terror operational troops and trainers from NATO countries for the Afghan national army. After the withdrawal, the US might provide $ five billion annually for the Afghan national army depending on approval from the US Senate. Whatever the level of commitment, there is little hope of any improvement in the present situation. A report in December 2013 by the US National Intelligence Estimates states that any progress made in Afghanistan is likely to disappear by 2017 and Afghanistan will, in all likelihood, descend into chaos. A UN report published in 2013 estimates that Afghanistan produced about 90 percent of the world’s opium in 2013, placing large amounts of illicit money in the hands of warlords and militants. This will further fuel lawlessness and instability. UK Prime Minister Cameron, on a visit to Camp Bastion in October 2013 stated that the British troops will soon be leaving Afghanistan as they have, “accomplished the mission”. President Obama declared in October 2013 that this war like all others wars has to end. These statements imply a detached policy towards Afghanistan. Anatol Lieven, author of Pakistan: A Hard Country, in a recent article, while analysing the situation of the US’s drawdown stated: “If Washington does not finally start paying attention, it will risk a catastrophe in Afghanistan that would be the greatest blow to American prestige since the fall of Saigon.” It is evident that there is no clear transition strategy. Consequently, even after troop withdrawal, US and NATO countries will continue to remain under the threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. Similarly, this entire region will face a law and order situation for a considerable time to come. Ahmed Rashid, in Viewpoint on BBC News recently stated, “Equally lacking is an economic transition”, adding that despite $ 100 billion spent on social services, the west has failed to build an indigenous economy in Afghanistan. The results of this massive expenditure are indeed abysmal. According to a 2010 UN report, 36 percent of the population lives below the poverty line with a further 37 percent living only slightly above it. There is likely to be a significant economic crisis. Without substantial support from foreign governments, Afghanistan beyond 2014 will not have the resources to run a reasonably effective government. These are all pointers towards chaos in a country facing an insurgency. In hindsight, Pakistan should have avoided entering wars in 1979 and 2001. On both occasions, it was erroneously thought that Pakistan would be able to avoid the consequences of a war and, at the same time, be able to increase Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan. Instead, Pakistan should have pursued goals of economic and social development rather than engaging in wars that have just brought instability. Beyond 2014, Pakistan will face difficult decisions towards an unstable Afghanistan. Further compounding the problem are long standing issues like the Durand Line, the Afghan Transit Trade, refugees, the TTP and the unmanageable porous borders, all seemingly intractable in the prevailing air of suspicion. We should be wiser after 35 years of engaging in burdensome entangling alliances in Afghanistan. Evidently, these alliances have not brought stability, security or peace to Pakistan. Beyond 2014 should be “another time, another era” for us. Our focus should now be on our internal situation. The factors that will bring stability to Pakistan are a growing economy and stable institutions. Interfering in the political setup of Afghanistan will just result in more strife within Pakistan. It must be realised that with the present rate of economic growth of 3.5 percent there cannot be much social or economic stability. About 26 percent of our population lives below the poverty line. Literacy is a disputed 55 percent. Each year, a large number of youth enter the labour force, swelling the ranks of the unemployed. A peaceful and prosperous Pakistan requires large investments over decades in infrastructure, energy and social sectors, a sustained and reasonable rate of growth due to an economic development strategy. Now is the time to ponder and learn from our past. The writer is a former inspector general of police. He may be contacted at humayunshafi@gmail.com