It all started with a press release from the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) in which the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Raheel Sharif, expressed his displeasure on the behalf of officers and soldiers over the undue criticism of the Pakistan army. Afterwards, some television channels, out of nowhere, picked up an old ‘sizzling’ speech of the current minister of defence, Khwaja Asif, which he delivered in 2006 at the peak of Musharraf’s presidency as an opposition leader, and started playing it every night as if he had spoken against the army just a few days before. Ensuring to build a storm in a teacup, his words were then churned out with some of his recent interviews. How much can we criticise the army as an institution? Does the condemnation of the acts of a few generals or army officers equal lambasting the whole organisation? These are the questions that have engulfed most of discussions since then. True supporters of the armed forces, like the families of brave soldiers who have sacrificed their lives for the country, do not like the harsh criticism of their organisation for emotional reasons, and they are obviously not happy with the situation. However, they are not alone in their disapproval of such behaviour. Wolves in sheep’s clothing — the people who have benefitted from dictatorial regimes — are also showing their resentment towards the democratically elected civilian government to escalate tensions between the institutions. Another group of people railing against the current leadership of the PML-N is that of paid agents who, in order to protect General Musharraf, are trying to create a smokescreen of mass confusion, which may lead to the safe exit of the former president. The first argument I have heard against criticism and in support of the army is about the morale of the soldiers who, in our current, precarious situation, are ready to sacrifice their lives for the country. Their morale, they say, is disturbed if their service is disregarded or belittled by the civilian population. It seems like a valid explanation but it should not just be limited to the military. Since the life of every citizen of the state is precious, this rule must be in that case extended to the police and other law enforcement civilian institutions because they are also equally or sometimes even more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. We should, in fact, conduct an objective study in which the training, equipment and supportive services for the individuals of every institution are compared with each other. These facilities then should be evaluated against the intensity, frequency, complexity and severity of attacks on every organisation. The total number of casualties should be computed too, to calculate the appropriate risk. In short, we should attempt to quantify the morale and honour of all institutions according to the risk, exposure, performance and the criticism of their conduct. The second problem is that, in the past, in an attempt to make things better in the country, the army has overstepped and has assumed a role beyond its constitutional mandate. In my opinion, when it does that, for all practical purposes, it becomes a political party. Any organisation, whether it is a political party or not, when it takes over government, is bound to make mistakes. Some of these mistakes, as we can understand, are well intended while others are the result of pure inexperience and miscalculation. However, certain things can be guaranteed once these errors have been made: a segment of the population will be unhappy, it will create room for opposition and if that opposition is suppressed with force it will lead to deep resentment and animosity. This has happened in Pakistan, almost in the same order of events, many times. In these circumstances, it would be like burying one’s head in the sand if we thought that the institution was not involved in creating that problem. Moreover, it would be foolish to think that the political parties, which suffered during martial law, hold only one person responsible for their hardship. We know that General Musharraf was not alone during his tenure. There were officers who were targeting civilian leaders while others were negotiating with politicians to formulate the PML-Q. Still others were involved in discussions with the PPP for reconciliation. There were retired generals working as bureaucrats, as advisors to the president and the prime minister, as governors of the provinces, as state ministers, as the directors of intelligence agencies and public offices. Overall, this problem is very divisive: you are either with democracy or with the dictator. You are with the defence of Pakistan or against it. You want to see your country strong or you aspire to weaken it on the behest of her enemies. To find a solution under such tense circumstances is tremendously important to move forward. I think the answer to this problem lies within the Pakistan army itself. No matter how strict the punishment under Article 6 is made by politicians, until there are some basic checks and balances put in the Army Act, there will always be uncertainty and tension between the two institutions. The military, in order to calm things down and show its commitment to the democratic process, can introduce new rules in the Army Act. For instance, it can say that, if the COAS holds the constitution in abeyance, he will automatically be sacked and the vice chief of army or chief of the general staff will take over command for a short time, until the prime minister picks the next COAS. It can also ensure through the changes made in its rules that the person who attempts another coup de d’état will be handed over to the civilian government for a trial under Article 6 of the constitution. All officers who attempt to take the civilian government down will be arrested and so on. In short, a series of well-thought out assurances can be provided and practical steps can be taken for the people of Pakistan to protect their right to rule. The writer is a US-based freelance columnist. He tweets at @KaamranHashmi and can be reached at skamranhashmi@gmail.com