Human beings are a complex mix of biological, emotional, psychological and moral makeup. These inherent forces are often at war with each over. The passion for power (maximisation) has remained a driving force behind almost all limited or all-out wars. Ironically, however, the same warring humans have cooperated among themselves often in the immediate post-war period. With the evolution in collective political organisation, the phenomenon of authority and its legitimisation has also been constantly contested. Little surprise then, the city states were transformed into empires and empires into nation states on account of popular unrest in terms of revolutions and social movements. Indeed, the modern European nation states stand out as classical cases of socioeconomic and political contestation. The latter, with time, has developed a culture of its own — a culture of rationalised organisation, critical debates, deconstruction of totalised truth and protest. Unfortunately, however, the European model of nation and state making, along with its bogey of protest culture, could not flourish in post-colonial states. The primary reason, in my view, is the lack of cultural similarity with the European tradition of argumentation (mostly done inside pubs), social organisation and patterns of leadership. In other words, where the Europeans had a monarch, a patriarch, etc, as the ‘other’, the pre-and-post-colonial challengers had to confront the might of an already entrenched (British or French) nation state. Hence, to deal with the violent arm of the latter, South Asian protesters, for example, employed all sort of methods, i.e. street agitation, sit-ins, arrests, communal violence, mutinous tactics, killing the colonisers and, importantly, any shift in method was often situation oriented, not necessarily issue-based.Whereas the European protest mentality was premised on the centrality of freedom, the collective mindset in transitional societies and developing states was based on a multiplicity of factors. Regionalism, for example, became a hallmark of the Indian state under Nehru. However, for the independent minded in northeast India, for example, this seemed like usurpation of their fundamental rights. Hence, with time, more than 25 separatist movements have been launched against the state nation of India. The protesters use small-scale strikes to well-organised guerrilla warfare to achieve their objectives. Sri Lanka, till recently, was following a similar pattern though in a different geographic and political context. Interestingly, Pakistan’s case has certain contextual similarities with the Indian and Sri Lankan models as regards the conception of, and protestation for, fundamental human rights. Contrary to India’s approach, the Pakistani state preferred centralisation over regionalism. Consequently, the majority Bengalis were institutionally, culturally and politically marginalised. The marginalisation of the latter, along with the specific grievances of, for example, the Baloch, put Pakistan’s society on the path to protest politics. Whether it is the issue of the Bengalis’ cultural and democratic rights or the nature of the state, Pakistanis have marched on the streets. For instance, it was the protest politics of the late 1960s that caused the downfall of Ayub-led authoritarianism. Paradoxically, the religious forces, since day one, also believed in the efficacy of street power. Hence, on the issue of Ahmedis, rigging in the 1964 presidential election, etc, the clergy began protest politics. Indeed, the anti-Bhutto Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) played with street politics. Later on, from the anti-Zia Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) to the anti-Musharraf Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), political forces in Pakistan have registered their collective faith in protest politics. Not only this, their efforts paid off at the end of the day on account of the rationalisation of choices by stakeholders. Nevertheless, there are cases, i.e. East Pakistan, in Pakistan’s political history whereby lack of appreciation, if not acceptance of protest politics on the part of strategic and political actors led to agitation politics, to civil war and the consequent disintegration of the state. What we can conclude in view of the foregoing is that the non-European model of protest politics is, on the one hand, culturally dissimilar from the European one. On the other hand, there is contextual variation within, for example, the South Asian case. And, in the case of Pakistan, one can generate a pattern for protest politics. The latter is mostly situation-oriented and has been used as an effective instrument against (civilian and military) authoritarianism. Moreover, intellectually, the predecessors of protest politics of Pakistan — be they political parties or socio-cultural forces — have, through excessive sensitisation of the streets, provided us with theoretical and empirical basis to analyse the contours of Pakistani politics. Last but not least, the recent resort to protest politics led by Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri can be seen in view of the above. There are multiple but minor issues that these stakeholders tend to highlight. It is the political situation (context) that assumes a great role here too. However, there is a qualitative difference from the past protests: this time around, it is not military authoritarianism that is questioned and challenged. Rather, it is the very notion of democracy that is put at stake. However, unlike protest cases in the past, this recent episode lacks unanimity of purpose and issues across the political divide. This means the momentum is temporary and is unlikely to affect the present political and strategic dispensation any time soon. The writer is a DAAD fellow. He holds a PhD in political science and works as assistant professor at Iqra University, Islamabad. He tweets @ ejazbhatty