Politics is Pakistan has often remained complex, contested and nasty regardless of election campaigns. Since 1947 the country has seen various forms of political activism, different types of regimes and multiple challenges to the state. Indeed, Pakistan was partitioned in December 1971 due to the divergence of interests and choices on the part of the civil and military forces. It is quite unfortunate to note that, even after the country’s breakup, no lesson was learnt by state actors when it came to (re)distribution of resources. Politicians fight among themselves for petty reasons ranging from transfer of a mid-career bureaucrat to allocation of funds for some union council. Similarly, the bureaucracies, both civil and military, take, overall, a narrow and biased view of politicians, parliament and democratisation. The judiciary has tasted relative power of late. It also developed differences with parliament, especially during the Zardari-led dispensation. Importantly, before and after the partition of Pakistan, both civilians and the military have not developed institutional cordiality and political harmony towards each other. Each views the other from the estranged lens of power maximisation. Since the Zia years, politicians have attempted to assert themselves at times but they have collectively remained unable to oversee a comparatively powerful military. Part of the politicians’ failure can be ascribed to their lack of interest in understanding the intricacies of civil-military relations. Partly, they saw to their own political and economic interests and therefore did not develop the desire to formalize the rules of the game. From the politicians’ perspective, non-elective institutions did not provide them with due space to do the needful. Such dichotomies have generated, over time, institutional if not structural imbalances as regards civil and military relations. This became quite vivid during the second tenure of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The way he handled the army top brass and, more importantly, the way he was dealt with, is now well documented. Nawaz Sharif is again in power and has been for the past one and a half years. His government has managed foreign funds to rescue the dwindling economic situation. Also, the prime minster asserted himself to modify Pakistan’s foreign policy on India and Afghanistan. These measures might have displeased GHQ. The case of Musharraf is another stumbling block in civil-military relations. To add insult to injury, Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri have challenged the very writ of the Pakistani state by threatening to create chaos in terms of attacks on the law enforcing agencies; indeed, a couple of policemen have died and scores sustained serious injuries at the hands of Qadri’s followers during the past couple of weeks. Moreover, both Khan and Qadri demand the dismissal of the Sharif government, complete overhaul of the electoral system and holding of fresh elections. Contextually, the federal government, in alliance with the Punjab government, has imposed Article 245 in the Islamabad capital territory. Consequently, the citizens’ fundamental rights along with the Islamabad High Court’s jurisdiction are suspended for the time being. In addition, in Lahore, the capital of Punjab where the Sharif brothers rule the roost, 14 of Qadri’s workers were killed in a police encounter. This tragic incident has become the basis to criticise the Sharifs for state terrorism. In my view, there was no need to overwhelmingly rely on the administrative apparatus to tackle the ‘revolution’ of Dr Qadri. Political negotiations always come in handy if the engaged parties look for optimal goals. Similarly, there was no need to impose Article 245. This carries the paradoxical effect of estrangement of both the military and the judiciary. To defuse the situation, the federal government called a session of the National Security Council on August 9, whereby the military, led by General Raheel Sharif, expressed confidence in the civilian dispensation apparently. Nevertheless, both Imran Khan and Dr Qadri seem overobsessed with the so-called revolution march on August 14, celebrated as Pakistan’s Independence Day. The latter’s tone was so aggressive and threatening the other night when he urged his religiously inspired followers to take revenge on the Sharif brothers in case he is “martyred”. In this context, on August 11, the army called a corps commanders conference to discuss the impending political and security situation. Given the army’s stake in the country’s politics, such deliberations carry much significance. Though predictability is a very difficult task in social sciences, my agency model of Pakistan’s politics suggests that the military can stage the fifth coup if the Sharif government refuses to do the principal’s bidding, including the Musharraf affair. In another scenario, of the killing – God forbid – of either Imran Khan or Dr Qadri, or both, this shall further aggravate the problem of governance that can be regarded as a ground to pack the Sharifs off. If this materialises, a section of politicians (belonging to the PTI, PAT, PML-Q and even MQM and religious political parties), bureaucrats, judges and the media are behaviourally expected to ally with the military for rational reasons. Moreover, the international strategic and political environment seems conducive to conducting such an exercise. After all, General al-Sisi is surviving in Egypt despite a Democrats’ administration in the US. Almost similar is the case of Thailand that has whitened another coup recently.However, if martial law is imposed, the semblance of democracy that this poorly managed country has experienced during the last six years would suffer irreparable damage. Moreover, socio-economic growth, governance and the overall security situation will be alarming in the wake of an army operation in North Waziristan. In view of the foregoing, all stakeholders are suggested to play within the rules of the game, i.e. constitution, and strive hard to improve the socio-economic, security and democratic credentials of the country. A peaceful and socio-economically stable Pakistan is the need of the hour. If the larger interests of the state of Pakistan are not preferred at this critical juncture, small and short-term goals will lead us nowhere but to chronic chaos and multiple mayhem. The writer is a DAAD fellow. He holds a PhD in political science from Heidelberg University. He has authored Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan (2013). Currently, he works as assistant professor at Iqra University, Islamabad. He tweets @ ejazbhatty