I have been writing about the Middle East for a long time now and it is one region that never fails to intrigue me as a student of history. The reshaping of the Middle East as a result of a multitude of factors, including the toppling of Saddam Hussein, emerging Israel-west coldness, the Iran nuclear deal, the Arab Spring, the US’s desire for a less intrusive role in the region, decline of European power and threat of global terrorism have all created a huge power vacuum in the region. This vacuum will lead to the emergence of a new order in the region, which will lead to rebalancing of the power structure and will also lead to new geopolitical arrangements for the region.
The crisis in Iraq, Yemen and Syria, and protests in Bahrain, Lebanon, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are just the symptoms of the reality of the region. The rise of Islamic State (IS) has further complicated the security situation in the region and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations and Turkey, which were initially backing elements in IS in its fight against the Assad regime, are now themselves threatened by the rising military capability of IS. All this has made these nations jittery because of security challenges. The uneasiness stems from four broad factors. First and foremost is the threat of global non-state actors like IS. Second is the threat emerging from regional conflicts rooted in sectarian, ethnic and tribal divisions. Third are the conflicts rooted in changing the global energy economy paradigm (gas versus oil and shale). Last is the threat of internal turmoil in states, like the Arab Spring protests. These four factors individually or in a variety of combinations are causing uneasiness among all the countries of the region. And to combat the jitters, the major powers in the region are engaged in proxy wars from Syria to Yemen. Not only that but they have been fueling non-combatant internal power struggles in countries of the region, e.g. the Egyptian power struggle and Lebanese political infighting.
By virtue of the resources at their disposal, the GCC nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, have been major players in the region during the past few decades. With GCC countries ruled by Sunni/Salafi monarchs on one side and the Iranians on the other, the conflict attained a sectarian tinge. However, with squeezing European might, scaling back of US involvement in the region and the US-Iran deal leading to an embrace of Tehran by the international community, the GCC powers’ hand has weakened. Thus, they are becoming more and more reliant on two key regional powers, Pakistan and Turkey, in their war for survival against emerging Iranian dominance. With greater Pakistani and Turkish involvement in the Arab world’s affairs, eventually they will start dominating the region because of demographics and military power. The rise of Tehran is inevitable because of vast fossil fuel reserves, demographics, a skilled diaspora and large Shia populations being marginalised in almost all countries of the Middle East. Thus, the geopolitics of the region have come full circle where Iran, Turkey and Pakistan will become the key players in the security and economic arrangements of the region. The path towards this may be turbulent or smooth but, in a multi-polar world, this end is almost certain to happen.
Whether this transition remains smooth or turbulent will depend on the role the key players of the region (Iran, Turkey and Pakistan) choose to play. If they choose to become fair arbitrators of power and ensure protection of the political and economic interests of the players in the region, the transition will be smooth. If they choose to be driven by isolated self-interest and their sectarian, ethnic or other biases, the transition is bound to be extremely turbulent. The key is to introduce representative arrangements in the Middle East as a tool for solving conflicts while protecting the economic interests of key individual and national players. To enable them to exercise this, all three will have to become more democratic. Democracy, at the very primitive level, is the best form of representative government available. Having a representative ethos imbedded in their respective states, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran will have the experience as well as a model for others to broker a power structure in the region that is representative enough to pacify all key players in the region and within individual states. Unfortunately, neither the current elected leaders of the three countries nor the key power centres, i.e. the Turkish and Pakistani armies and Iranian clergy, have an exemplary record in this regard. However, for the interest of their states and for stability and peace in the region, these three states will have to move fast in that direction.
The second factor determining smoothness or turbulence will be the speed at which the monarchs in the region adapt to the changing power realities of the region. This, in part, will depend on the protection of their economic and tribal interests for which Iran will have to show magnanimity and, in part, will depend on whether Pakistan and Turkey approach the problem as parties to the conflict or as fair arbitrators.
The third factor will be if India aspires for a broader security role in the region. Stopping it requires a clearer understanding between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan on fair power distribution in the region. The three emerging regional powers will have to chalk out a framework where they can sit together and act as fair arbitrators of regional conflicts reconciling the sectarian, economic and political interests of various players in the region.
History has moved full circle and has put three key western allies from the 1960s in a position where they can revive the cooperative framework. Only this time they have a bigger role and more responsibility. Whether they can live up to it to ensure the least turbulent transition in the region or not remains to be seen.
The author can be reached on twitter at @aalimalik