It is said that the end of the Cold War in 1991 marked the advent of the second nuclear age, the first being the Cold War era itself. The second nuclear age can be divided into two phases. The first phase was from 1991 to 2000 in which Pakistan refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and tested its nuclear weapons in May 1998. Nevertheless, the era ended with Pakistan (like India) struggling to cope with economic sanctions (under the Glenn Amendment) imposed by the US in reaction to their nuclear tests. The second phase (from 2001 onward) began with the gory incident of 9/11. This phase is marked by Pakistan’s entering into the war on terrorism. Consequently, two concessions were given to Pakistan: first, economic sanctions were lifted and, second, the (alleged) activities of the nuclear proliferation network of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan were condoned (though the stigma of nuclear proliferation is still attached to Pakistan’s name). Economic sanctions on India were also lifted in 2001 and it joined the war willingly.
Pakistan is a de facto nuclear state but it is still at the level of an unrecognised one (or not a legitimate nuclear power). Pakistan intended to sign both treaties as a legitimate nuclear power and not as a non-nuclear power. Pakistan, like India, had been refused to do so. Nevertheless, there can be identified five main facets that have individual or collective bearing on the nuclear future of Pakistan. First, Pakistan has so far shown a reactive nuclear posture towards India. Pakistan did not sign the NPT and CTBT simply because India did not sign them and Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons because India tested its own (second time) in 1998. In this way, Pakistan has selected to hide behind India’s nuclear posture instead of erecting its own.
Second, Pakistan claims that its nuclear capability is for deterrence against any Indian aggression. In relation to the phrase, nuclear deterrence, Pakistan may be thinking in terms of first strike or second strike capability as a nuclear-use doctrine, though it is understandable that first strike (convenient for Pakistan) against India is difficult because of India’s huge Muslim population and the second strike (not convenient for Pakistan) against India is itself full of technical complexities in the given (longitudinal) strategic depth of Pakistan. However, it seems that Pakistan is approaching a time when the relationship between nuclear and deterrence (whether minimum or maximum and whether quantitative or qualitative) may become irrelevant. Similarly, the time is moving beyond strike options, as counter-strike capabilities are the talks of a nuclear warfare that has practically never taken place except theoretically. The faster the world is entering the age of space technology coupled with electronic jamming systems (electronic warfare) and missile defence systems (missile warfare), the quicker nuclear bombs are losing their importance as annihilating instruments. Pakistan is not ready yet for these types of warfare.
Third, Pakistan still takes refuge in various theories of encirclement such as China encircling India, India encircling Pakistan and the US encircling China. These theories help Pakistan to be fearful of one country and to count on another country to readjust its foreign policy accordingly. However, the post-2001 era has brought to the fore the necessity of economic cooperation. For instance, in 2008, the US signed the 123 Agreement with India to sell it nuclear fuel and reactor components for civilian nuclear consumption to generate energy. The US expected to earn something in return. Similarly, the US-China trade volume (import plus export) was $ 521 billion in 2013 in comparison to two billion dollars in 1979, despite differences between both countries on various disputes over the South China Sea. One of the major reasons compelling the US to engage China and India was to make them contribute politically and economically to the war on terror, and they did. In a way, three independent economies (US, China and India) are trying to share something financial amongst them. Pakistan is relying on two of them financially and is hostile towards one of them militarily. Pakistan has not yet realised that encirclement theories are more congruous to the Cold War era than afterwards.
Fourth, Pakistan relies overly on China to gain strength of its (nuclear and physical) survival regionally. However, the post-2001 era is witnessing a gradual shift in China’s position both regionally and internationally and with that the comfort zone (where Pakistan used to bask) is also shrinking. China and India are both trying to foster trade relations with each other (despite their differences on Tibet) and seek benefits from each other’s growing economies. For example, there are earnest efforts from both sides to develop a land trade route such as the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor and sea route such as the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). Both countries also intend to deal with each other politically and economically at the platform of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) where Russia is their third main partner. Both countries are willing to invest in each other and enhance people-to-people contact. Similarly, both are willing to settle for border peace through mutual settlement or through the status quo. Pakistan has not learnt yet how to survive both regionally and internationally without China’s help.
Fifth, Pakistan is beset with a huge foreign debt and liabilities amounting to $ 65 billion in September 2014. These debts and liabilities are bound to keep Pakistan technologically backward and economically dependent on other countries and international financial institutions. Pakistan has not yet learnt the lesson on how to live economically independent as a proud nation.
The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at [email protected]