There has lately been plenty of media commentary and analyses here suggesting that US-China relations might be reaching a crunch point regarding the issue of sovereignty over old and newly reclaimed islands/islets/rocks that China claims as its and has occupied. Other regional countries that include Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, which China regards as its own renegade province, contest China’s sovereignty claims. The US comes into the picture as some of the regional claimants, like the Philippines, are US allies and others, like Vietnam, are new friends. The US, though, maintains that it has no position on the question of sovereignty but simply would like China to resolve it peacefully through dialogue with its neighbours. But, apart from this, there is a bigger issue involved here: China’s virtually blanket claim and its assertion through building military facilities on the old and newly-reclaimed and dredged islands/islets will turn almost all of the South China Sea into its exclusive lake, thus impeding freedom of navigation through these important waterways. And it is this right to freedom of navigation the US has challenged by sending a naval ship through the 12-nautical miles’ exclusive zone around the Chinese claimed and dredged islands. The US is insisting that it will continue to sail, fly and operate through these international waters. China has reacted furiously to this threat to its “sovereignty and security interests”. A Chinese foreign ministry statement said that it had “monitored, followed and warned” the US warship during its journey and it would “take all necessary measures” to safeguard its sovereignty against any “premeditated provocation”. A US statement said that their mission to cruise through international waters “was completed without incident”. According to media reports here, “…more than half the world’s merchant tonnage plies back and forth through this navigable chokehold between the Western Pacific and Indian oceans.” And with China claiming ownership and intent on prevailing with political and military means, there is enough fuel for a conflagration, as the US seems equally determined to challenge China’s 12-nautical miles’ exclusive zone through the Spratly Islands. During a panel discussion on Australia’s relations with China on a highly rated television forum here, a Chinese panelist was asked about what Beijing’s reaction in such an event would be. He had no answer but he reiterated China’s sovereign claim over the disputed islands and the waters surrounding them. But an answer of sorts was underlined in a 2011 editorial in China’s Global Times, which bluntly warned, “If these countries [opposing China] do not want to change their ways with China, they will need to prepare for the sounds of cannons. We need to be ready for that as it may be the only way for the disputes in the sea to be resolved.” Even accounting for its rhetorical flourish, it is quite a serious way of putting China’s “core interest” as Beijing has defined it. In other words, there is not much scope for compromise as Beijing sees it; mercifully, though, the situation remains under control. It was in 2011 that the visiting President Obama announced in the Australian parliament the US “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region: a ‘rebalancing’ of US focus from a decade of engagement in the Middle East. This meant that the US would be deploying more of its military assets in this region and intended to remain a strong Pacific power. In other words, the US was not thinking of leaving the Asia-Pacific region for China to establish its primacy. And, in this respect, Australia would become an even more important regional ally. As part of this renewed regional focus, the US would rotate and station its forces and other military assets through Australia. In other words, the US will use base facilities in Australia as part of its revived Asia-Pacific strategy. In Australia, the view across the political divide, backed by a majority of its people, is in favour of a strong US alliance to face any threat from China. And its projection of power in the South China Sea is considered a serious threat to regional stability. It is, therefore, considered necessary to let China know that it will have costs. And for that there is a need to take a stand that might require challenging the 12-mile exclusive zone. This issue featured in recent US-Australia strategic talks in the US. Australia’s new Prime Minister (PM), Malcolm Turnbull, has reportedly emphasized, “We have to stand up for a rules-based international order, which means that the strongest power [in the region] cannot just do whatever it likes…” as China is apparently doing in the South China Sea. As regards the US naval patrol through the Chinese line, Canberra has supported the US’ action. Its defense minister, Marise Payne, said, “It is important to recognise that all states have a right under international law to freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight, including in the South China Sea. Australia strongly supports these rights.” She added, “Australia is not involved in the current US activity in the South China Sea.” Canberra’s dilemma is how to reconcile its primary trade relationship with China and its priority strategic relationship with the US. China is Australia’s top trading partner and both countries have recently signed a free trade agreement to further boost their economic relationship. This is sustainable only if Australia does not find itself in the position of having to confront China in the South China Sea as part of its security alliance with the US, if and when called upon to make a common cause. Indeed, Washington might ask Australia at some point to join the US to sail through the 12-nautical miles’ zone and, having supported the US action in principle and as a security partner, Canberra might not be able to get out of it. That could trigger a crisis in China-Australia relations. Australia is somehow hoping that it will not come to this. And some analysts in Washington and Canberra have been trying to read this into President Xi Jinping’s comment during a White House press conference, on how China had no intention of militarising the Spratly Islands. On the other hand, it could simply mean that China’s understanding of its new facilities on the islands is that these are civilian outposts. But Xi’s comment was picked up as a hopeful sign that China might not, after all, be pushing the confrontation button. Australia’s foreign minister, Julie Bishop, seemed relieved as she observed: “We do note and we do welcome President Xi’s statement when he was here in the US, in Washington, that the Chinese government did not intend to militarise the Spratly Islands [in the South China Sea].” She added, “We welcome that statement and we will certainly hold China to it.” This would only mean that both China and the US (and its ally Australia) want to avoid confrontation. But both sides are trying to read their own meaning into the developing situation in the South China Sea, which is increasingly tense and has the potential of becoming ugly. The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia. He can be reached at sushilpseth@yahoo.co.au