In the context of Pak-India relations, the year 1999 can be called one of the most significant years of the post-Cold War phase starting in 1991. There took place sequentially three correlated events of immense significance. First, the then Prime Minister (PM) of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, visited Pakistan in February 1999 and tried to clear the air of misgiving that has existed between both countries since 1947. Vajpayee, who was heading the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, came to Lahore through the dosti (friendship) bus service between Delhi and Lahore and signed the Lahore Declaration. He tried to assure Pakistanis that India was not against Pakistan and that India had accepted Pakistan’s existence from the core of its heart. The meeting was an effort at the bilateral level to establish civilian-to-civilian contact between the two countries. Second, immediately after the Lahore Declaration — on which the Pakistan army had certain reservations: resolution of the Kashmir issue and normalisation of relations with India — the Pakistan army bypassed the civilian government and launched the Kargil war without acquiring formal approval. The army wanted the Kashmir issue to be kept in the limelight and not get dumped under any kind of bonhomie. Third, the end of the Kargil war, a few months later, in 1999, suggested that India could persuade or coerce the US to intervene in regional conflict (replete with nuclear repercussions) and rein in its ally, Pakistan, which had to eventually withdraw its forces from Kargil. The ensuing history indicates three main consequences of the events of 1999. First, India emphasised less on establishing friendly relations with Pakistan and more on fostering its amicable associations with the US. Second, the occurrence of events successively not only underlined the reality of civil-military conflict in Pakistan but also underscored the reality of persistent bilateral animosity prevailing between Pakistan and India. Third, the US became a new force in the region to reckon with. It made a tilt towards India at the cost of its relations with Pakistan. This is important because the US preferred India to Pakistan in both strategic and trade aspects. Currently, the balance in the region, South Asia, is tipped more towards India. The loss to Pakistan can be gauged if Pakistan tries to answer the following questions: first, can Pakistan invite now incumbent PM Narendra Modi through a friendly bus service (or even by air) to sign another Lahore Declaration? The answer is in the negative. Pakistan has lost its credibility in the eyes of India. Second, can Pakistan launch another Kargil war to accentuate the Kashmir issue? The answer is in the negative. Even China does not approve of that. Any such adventure will invite severe international reaction. Pakistan has lost credibility in the eyes of the world. Third, can Pakistan again solicit the US’s support against India? The answer is in the negative. Both the US and India have gone too far on the alliance journey that Pakistan is fast becoming irrelevant. Nevertheless, what hurt Pakistan more was the nonexistence of realisation of the fact that Pakistan was fast losing in 1999. Pakistan lost its credibility in the eyes of both India and the US. One reason could be that Pakistan was a poor reader of the events that were unfolding. However, another reason could be that Pakistan considered China a panacea for its ills. China had its own limitations. With hindsight, either the Lahore Declaration should not have been signed or the Kargil war should not have been waged.It is rightly said that the foreign policy of a country is a reflection of its domestic policies. Pakistan’s domestic policies have remained conflict ridden. The primary nature of conflict was between its civilian leadership and the military command to get a hold on power to make key politico-strategic decisions. The consequences of such internal conflicts have been expressed in the foreign policy domain, as happened in 1999. Looking back, the exacerbated civil-military relations in 1999 ravaged Pakistan’s credibility on both regional and international levels. The end sufferers are the people of Pakistan. Pakistan is now seeking out Russia for help. It is keen to enter into all those regional ties and associations where Russia is present as a member. This is the first expression of the realisation of our loss. Similarly, this is the first attempt to wriggle out of the morass of regional and international isolation. The dilemma is not whether Pakistan has made a right selection or a wrong one even as a reactionary gesture; the quandary is whether or not Pakistan has understood the cause of its problems. One can argue that while the domestic front was embroiled in civil-military conflict in 1999, Pakistan did not foresee the coming of 9/11, which did the rest of the job of rendering Pakistan regionally isolated. However, one can argue that countries should be emboldened and fortified to survive on the basis of their declared (and formulated) policies and not on the basis of incidents in history. Why does history tend to oscillate Pakistan, which was on one end of relevance in 1999 but is on the opposing end of relevance in 2015? Today, the situation has come to such a pass that Pakistan has to ask the US to convince India to stop bombarding the Line of Control and restart bilateral dialogue once again. Today, India knows that Pakistan cannot dictate directly its terms of engagement and disengagement. The initiative of both now rests with India. Today, Pakistan’s reliance on the US to pacify India also favours the US as the latter has been obliging Pakistan time and again by entreating India to come to terms with Pakistan. Today, China is also asking Pakistan to improve its bilateral ties with India. Today, Pakistan is struggling with improvement in civil-military relations, ultimately affecting its foreign relations. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com