Iraq is one rolling tragedy after another. A hodgepodge of a country created by the British after the First World War out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire to serve their own economic and strategic interests, Iraq has struggled to find its new national identity. And this is not surprising because it was and has been an artificial creation clubbing together disparate regions, tribes, ethnicities, superimposed with the oldest sectarian schism in Islam between the Sunnis and Shias. Out of a welter of bloody power struggles, Saddam Hussein finally prevailed and went on to build a state of fear with all power virtually invested in him. After consolidating his power by eliminating all his real and imagined enemies, he sought to terrorise the country’s Shia majority and Kurdish minority, seeing them as his natural enemies. He was a feared leader at home and was not much of a hit with most of his Arab neighbours. However, following the 1979 revolution in Iran, he was increasingly seen as a useful counterweight to Iran’s new clerical regime, which was on a political warpath with the US. The US embassy and its personnel were under siege, regarded as “a nest of spies” working for the now toppled Shah of Iran who was the US’s trusted ally in the region. The new political order in Iran led by its supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, was also causing nervousness in the Sunni Arab world. At the same time, Saddam’s Iraq had its own scores to settle involving maritime and territorial disputes with Iran. The US seemed more than happy to help Iraq with weapons and intelligence to start and prosecute its war against Iran. The long war that ensued between the two countries, with Iran suffering tremendous loss of life, was fought to a stalemate and ended after eight years of carnage (1980-88). Even though Iran suffered heavy losses, it was Saddam who emerged from the war considerably weakened. He had received much encouragement and help from the US, and funding from the Gulf monarchs as they all wanted the new Iran contained, if not destroyed. But they did not have much sympathy for him when he failed so badly in his and their shared objective. His Arab creditors, the Gulf rulers, wanted their money back as they had liberally advanced him loans but Saddam’s treasury was virtually empty after the long and disastrous war with Iran. He, therefore, sought to retrieve and even benefit from his planned invasion of oil-rich Kuwait. A successful military invasion and occupation of Kuwait would give Saddam’s Iraq all the oil revenue from that oil-rich country, strengthening his position in the Arab world and in the regional oil cartel. He apparently raised the issue with the then US ambassador and heard no specific objections to his ambitious plan to invade Kuwait. It was only when his forces were in Kuwait with its annexation more or less accomplished that the US realised the enormity of the Saddam adventure that could change the regional geostrategic situation to its detriment and that of its regional allies like Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchs. The resultant Gulf War (1990-91) under US leadership was disastrous for Saddam and he would have been easily toppled but for then President George Bush Sr’s decision to instead strangulate Iraq politically and economically. In the decade or so that followed the first Gulf War, Iraq bled under UN sanctions with its children and sick suffering the most. A number of powerful Republicans thought that Bill Clinton’s presidency, which followed Bush Sr’s electoral defeat, had wasted the US’s unparalleled opportunity as the world’s only superpower to expand its horizon and power. In 1997, a small group of them, which included Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, promulgated ‘The Project for the New American Century’ for doing just that, keeping in view the 2000 presidential elections. Its wide-ranging agenda included encouraging an invasion of Iraq to restructure the Middle Eastern geostrategic map to strengthen the US and Israeli power. And, as it happened, George Bush Jr, their own man, won the 2000 presidential election presenting opportunities to roll out their plans. Even as the Republicans were relishing their election victory, the country was unexpectedly hit by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. While the US went after Afghanistan to hunt out the al Qaeda leadership, the blueprint for the new American century as it related to Saddam’s Iraq appeared tantalisingly promising. Iraq seemed to fit neatly into the larger al Qaeda picture and was also accused of producing weapons of mass destruction. The US cobbled together a ‘coalition of the willing’ to get rid of Saddam. Whether or not Saddam’s Iraq was guilty as charged was immaterial. The act of toppling Saddam was considered good enough to ‘liberate’ Iraq and usher in ‘democracy’ in that country, which would serve as an example for the entire region. The tragedy now being enacted in Iraq, with the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) militants rushing in to turn much of Iraq and the neighbouring region of Syria into a terrorist haven, might prove more lethal than Afghanistan. All this follows from the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Having announced ‘Mission accomplished’ following Saddam’s fall and the US occupation, the next blunder was the dismantling of the Ba’ath party and all the existing state structures, including the Iraqi army. This turned the country into a veritable state of anarchy. And when the US occupation sought to create some semblance of order, there was no effective leadership material at hand. They chose Nouri al-Maliki to run the country. This selection process is a story in itself as recounted by Dexter Filkins in a recent issue of The New Yorker. And Maliki became Iraq’s prime minister (US support helped him, elected by the new parliament) and still continues in that position, though his position seems increasingly shaky. Maliki is an unreconstructed diehard politician with scores to settle with the country’s old Sunni establishment — what is left of it. Maliki was one of the targets of Saddam’s megalomania and power craze but he managed to escape to Iran to live another day, and to even become Iraq’s prime minister. Unlike Saddam, who was no sectarian zealot but a tyrant with an eye on power, Maliki has been determined to exclude Sunnis from any power sharing. When the US was the occupying power they had, at one point, largely succeeded in defeating the al Qaeda insurgency with the help of Sunni tribal militias they had created, mobilised and financed. And these militias were supposed to be integrated into the new Iraqi national army. However, Maliki would have none of it. He not only excluded Sunnis from power sharing, his new regime went on a killing spree targeting Sunnis. No wonder that many Sunnis are sympathetic, if not collaborating, with the ISIL. And we now have the spectacle of regional and international intervention to further fuel an already burning fire. The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia. He can be reached at sushilpseth@yahoo.co.au