A lot is happening in the region around us, which has serious implications for us as well as the globe. The chaos started with the fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq and the US’s inability to deal with its aftermath through a flimsy military and non-existent political plan. After Obama announced his ‘cut and run’ from Iraq, the French, British and Saudi-led plan to topple secular, dictatorial regimes in the region led to a power vacuum that has seen the emergence of the hardliner Islamic State (IS). IS now controls Sunni dominated areas in Iraq and Syria, including a few major cities and oil fields. The rise of IS has led to a conflict between al Qaeda and IS; to assert its credentials, al Qaeda has intensified its activities in Yemen. Just when Houthi rebels in Yemen are being backed, allegedly, by the Iranians — a big concern for the Saudis in the south — the fact that al Qaeda may become uncurtailable in Yemen must have played in with Saudis’ calculation of actively getting involved in Yemen.
The latest entrant to the Middle East is Russia, which has decided to actively back the Assad regime and Iraqi government in curbing IS. Russia is concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism on its southern flank and is also worried about the active participation of Caucasian extremists among IS ranks. The announcement of intelligence and security cooperation between Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria is a major turn in regional events.
This turn of events has put significant pressure on the already vulnerable Saudi regime. For one, its actions in Yemen have highlighted its limitations. It is perceived as a regime that supported and nurtured elements in Iraq and Syria that pioneered IS. If that were not enough, the Hajj disaster provided Iran with the opportunity to settle scores with the Saudis. Above all, because of its support for hardliner Islamic elements across the Muslim world, the Kingdom is facing a serious PR backlash from its traditional allies like Pakistan, Lebanon and North African nations. Though a lot is questionable about the Saudis’ behaviour in the past, squeezing the regime further will lead to an alternative that is even worse. If the Saudi regime collapses or weakens, it will lead to the emergence of Shias in the north and east of the country. However (and this is the worst part), the rest of the country will be an open field for IS and al Qaeda to battle it out. In fact, if one looks beyond the words on the possible way ahead for global power players, they have all but conceded that the new stalemate will involve regions in Iraq and Syria that will be under the control of IS (albeit the moderate or ‘good’ IS). This will put the pressure of the Saudis on the east and north. If the regime is weakened further, it will be hard to stop IS from running over Saudi regions. Couple this with the ever strengthening of al Qaeda in Yemen and the Saudi regime has a lot of vulnerabilities to deal with. IS controlling a vast area comprising parts of Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia will be a nightmare but then al Qaeda controlling areas in Yemen and Saudi Arabia alongside will multiply the horrors.
Though the Gulf States, with the exception of Bahrain for its sectarian problems, seem more stable, the emergence of a large extremist state in the region along with the ever increasing clout of the ayatollahs of Iran make them fear for their own sovereignty. Traditionally, these states have either been sucked into a great empire in the region or have been turned into a client state of the empire. This changed when the British gave them protection against both the Ottomans and Iranians by assuming the security responsibilities for these states. This was taken up by the US after World War II. Post-Iranian Revolution, the states mostly moved closer to Saudi Arabia under the ambit of the US security umbrella.
With emerging realities in the region and the US looking to scale back its involvement in the region, this agreement seems to be collapsing. These states need new security arrangements to protect them against the possibility of Iranian hegemony as well as potential IS hegemony. The Indian Prime Minister’s (PM’s) visit to the UAE should be seen and analysed in this light. Having said that, the Gulf States realise that India cannot be their first priority for a security guarantee because of a number of social and political variables at play. They would need to have security arrangements involving Pakistan as well. China too has major energy stakes in the region and would be interested in being part or patron of any regional security arrangement. With the entrance of Russia in the region, it will be interesting to see how Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, open up to Russian involvement.
Saudi Arabia also needs security assurances against a potentially hegemonic Iran and Islamists at home and on its borders. But what will determine Saudi success will be whether the Kingdom is ready to dissociate its policies of harbouring those elements as a foreign policy tool. The coming months will make it clear whether western powers want to make amends for their misadventures in the region or are happy with leaving the region in perpetual chaos. We will soon know whether we will have an international effort to bring peace to the region or whether the direct stakeholders will have to move on their own to prevent chaos. Time is fast running out.
The author can be reached on twitter at @aalimalik