The attack on the Bacha Khan University in Charsadda on January 20, 2016 was a gruesome reminder of the vulnerability of citizens living in a state ransacked by ideological banditry. The December 16, 2014, attack on the Army Public School (APS) had hardly receded in our memory when terrorism, yet again, devastated families by taking the lives of 25 and injuring approximately 60 at the Bacha Khan University. A day earlier, a blast hit a security check post manned by levies in Karkhano Market, Peshawar, killing 10 and injuring 20. This was preceded by an attack on the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) office on December 29, 2016 in Mardan, 30 km from Charsadda, which killed 26 and injured 50. Unfortunately, the end cannot be predicted as the question remains unanswered on whether the state is ‘managing’ terrorism or intends to eliminate the mindset that is producing it even after those shocking incidents. Subsequent measures like the All Parties Conference (APC), held on December 17, 2014 and the formation of the special committee in the wake of the APS attack to implement the 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) generated hope that those brutal acts might comprehensively change the state’s response to terrorism. The result was a spiked up military operation against the terrorists, mainly in the tribal areas, with the Rangers focused on corruption in Karachi. But, apparently, the NAP continues to remain in limbo. Does the situation demand an entire change of paradigm to eliminate the extremist mindset or a mere tactical change to mow down some gun-toting cliques? The nature of terrorism in Pakistan’s case is endogenous and policymakers should look into those foreign and security polices, which brought the country to such a pass. By clinging to the decades’ old security paradigm, the state can seemingly suppress the terrorists but cannot eliminate the root causes. In contrast, the war on terror in Pakistan has further entrenched the security paradigm that, by default, is incapable of a policy overhaul. Moreover, pluralism, democracy, constitutionalism and supremacy of parliament are antitheses to the extremists’ mindset that furnishes a great abhorrence to these characteristics. Ironically, in the name of inefficiency and corruption, the current narratives are deriding those symbols of democracy. Though the ongoing military operation, Zarb-e-Azab, was launched before the APS incident, the consensus amongst the political parties was attributed to the attack. It might be correct in the case of few exceptions such as the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the Jamaat-e-Islamai (JI), whose tilt to the establishment is no longer a secret and who were opposed to military action against the militants. But if parliament represents national consensus, the previous parliament during the Pakistan People’s Party’s (PPP’s) coalition government ordered a similar decisive military action against the Taliban in Swat and South Waziristan. How does Zarb-e-Azab differ, in terms of consensus, from the decision taken by the previously democratically elected government? According to the official account, the Taliban took over Swat towards the end of 2008 while the army was deployed there in late 2007. The PPP and its coalition partners, particularly the Awami National Party (ANP), bore the brunt of that decision of taking decisive action against the Taliban who had reached Buner after Swat. Instead of giving credit to the civilians for risking their lives for taking such decisions, our media began to draw comparisons between the civil and military contribution forgetting that the army or military was a federal service and had to act upon the orders of the civilian elected leadership. Yet, it could not be established that the terrorist and extremist mindset was a consequence of the civilians’ incapability or their lack of control on all spheres of policymaking and implementation. Parliament approved the military action but was not empowered to establish its oversight on the operational mechanisms. Any sovereign parliament taking responsibility of authorising military actions, particularly on its soil, would not overlook the minutest detail of its implementation and results. But, in Pakistan’s case, that definitive parliamentary control is missing. The ongoing narrative, especially on the media, is reinforcing militarisation as the only option to overcome militancy and terrorism, and is reluctant to promote alternate voices that can counter that mindset. Broadly speaking, some so-called analysts deliberately twist the facts and streams of terrorism. In this regard, the difference between extremists and our media’s narrative is of degree, not form. In the name of liberalism and westernisation, extremists denounce democracy and the parliamentary system. On the other hand, the media narrative lambasts civilians and democracy as corrupt and inefficient. The alternative is not to help overcome the shortcomings of elected governments by making them functional but to wind up the entire democratic system. For the past two years, both the print and electronic media have become more selective in presenting alternate voices. The moderate voices, trying to clinch a space between militancy and militarism, were either blacked out or went meek. We cannot juxtapose terrorism in Pakistan with that in France or other western countries. Unlike them, Pakistan is suffering from a boomerang effect of elements considered strategic assets in the past. It requires more than military measures or militarisation to turn it around. The logic seems perverse that by eliminating certain elements through military actions we can overcome radicalization, which manifests itself in the form of terrorism, violence and intolerance. If the state wants to reverse the tide, it should respond holistically and invest in it the same way it did when creating it. The writer is a political analyst from Swat and can be reached at talimand.khan@gmail.com and on Twitter @MirSwat