Sir: Pakistan is fighting terrorism for the last 10 years without much success. The basic reason for failure is the absence of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, which in itself is the result of lack of conceptual clarity, vision, sincerity of purpose, resolve and selfishness on the part of the leadership. Currently, peace through negotiations or military operations is earnestly being debated somewhat superficially without comprehending the issue of terrorism and extremism in its entirety. This has created an impression that terrorism and extremism will end either by successful talks with, or military operations against, the Taliban. The Taliban are just a factor and not the only factor responsible for the present state of affairs in the country though their terrorist activities have exceeded the tolerance threshold and definitely require immediate and stern action. However, the exclusive and exploitative socio-economic, religious, sectarian, flawed foreign and internal policies and corruption of the rulers since 1947 are the real causes of the discontentment, frustration, loss of hope and confidence in the country amongst the masses. This situation created the ideal conditions for the emergence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other terrorist groups and acceptance of their narrative by a considerable section of the population. A counter-terrorism strategy not addressing the root causes of terrorism and extremism at best will be a terror-management strategy, which may stabilize the situation temporarily. This is what we have been doing since 2003-4 without the desired results. The counter-terrorism strategy, therefore, should have long to medium and short term objectives coupled with a media strategy, relevant foreign policy objectives and a credible counter-narrative. Long term policy objectives should aim at inclusive and distributive socio-economic policies, education and madrassa reforms, restructuring of state institutions, population control management, elimination of political interference, speedy and free justice, electoral and judicial reforms and control of mafias and cartels, etc. Medium to short term objectives should include the police and intelligence agencies’ reform, anti-terrorism legislation in consonance with the threat perception, creation of a counter-terrorism force with integral intelligence capability, prosecution branch under a unified command structure at the federal level with authority and capability to operate and act immediately throughout Pakistan on actionable intelligence. This force must be equipped with the latest intelligence gathering gadgets and weapons and equipment. The immediate objective of the counter-terrorism strategy must be the elimination of the TTP and other terrorist groups. Should the military operation become inevitable, it should be launched wholeheartedly and ruthlessly with clearly defined military/political objectives and timeframe. It must have unambiguous political ownership with the objective of employing the army for a minimum essential duration. District political administration and civilian law enforcement agencies must be trained to take over from the army as soon as possible after the operation, unlike Swat where the army is still tied up even after four years of a largely successful operation. The degree of success of this operation will depend upon the political will, role of the media and measures taken by the provincial governments to unearth and apprehend terrorists’ sleeper cells and their facilitators in the major cities of the country. Not to forget the required arrangements for the internally displaced persons (IDPs). Media has become the most important element in shaping the political environment. A proactive media policy must be formed to educate the people, counter hostile propaganda and disseminate the government’s narrative in a transparent and credible manner. Media must not provide a propaganda forum to the terrorists and their sympathizers. Unless these prerequisites are achieved, no counter-terrorism strategy will be successful in the long run. Mian Muhammad Siddique Via Email