Like Sisyphus of Greek mythology, Pakistan and India seem damned by the gods to eternally roll a boulder up a hill only to find when they reach the top that it has rolled back down again. Sisyphus was condemned to this trial for his misdeeds in life. Can we say something similar can be found in the Indian and Pakistani establishments, especially with regard to each other? As the Pakistani and Indian foreign secretaries prepare to meet and resume the stalled composite dialogue between the two countries on August 25, the hope is that this time we will reach the top, that the curse has been lifted, but the fundamental attitudes of the respective bureaucratic, military and diplomatic establishments being the same, said hope is thin. They view each other with extreme suspicion. The ingrained propaganda of both states has left scars on the mentalities of their ruling elites as well as citizens, wounds born of the conflicts their respective national narratives necessarily engender. Since partition, Pakistan’s security establishment has been suspicious that India has hegemonic regional ‘designs’ and that subsuming Pakistan is the ultimate Indian goal. Its posture is therefore defensive and focused on ‘countering’ Indian ‘designs’ in Afghanistan, Bangladesh (former East Pakistan), and other regional hotspots as a strategy of indirect, pre-emptive defence, usually with disastrous results. This ironically undermines the state’s ability to act wisely, shown by its misadventures in Kashmir in 1965 and Kargil in 1999, or to use diplomacy to seek recompense for what it sees as past injustices. What are these injustices? That in 1947 India broke the understanding that princely states like Kashmir, with large Muslim populations, would accede to Pakistan. The opposite happened, and in 1947 Pakistan invaded Kashmir with the help of tribal militias, the forefathers of the very militants against whom an operation is underway today. Because of its defensive posture, which quickly became ingrained in both military and political thinking despite publicly aggressive statements, Pakistan eventually organised militias into proxies to conduct offensive operations against India. The results of that project are before us today. That India did desire Pakistan’s reintegration into it is an open secret. Unlike Pakistan, which built an identity around resistance to India and viewed India as an existential strategic threat, India’s problem has been suppressing or otherwise maintaining New Delhi’s hold on the vast, diverse, and fiercely independent regional, caste, ethnic and sub-national entities that combine to make up the Indian polity. Within this framework Pakistan, through the Indian lens, is seen as a troublesome and misguided younger brother, an attitude that Pakistani diplomats consider patronising and counter-productive. It also allows India to dismiss casually Pakistani reservations about Kashmir until such time as militarism or effective diplomacy (a rare occurrence for Pakistan) reignites the issue. Hence India accuses Pakistan of attempted destabilisation, which Pakistan denies, and the cycle goes on repeating itself. With two new governments in power, the hope is that this time it will be different; that the boulder will not roll back down the hill. Both sides have a realistic expectation that past Bharatiya Janata Party and PML-N friendship initiatives can be reformulated. Previously they resulted in moves towards cross-border trade and making the Line of Control in Kashmir porous, which would be immensely positive for the people of Kashmir on both sides. Congress, historically belligerent towards Pakistan, has been reduced to a rump status in the Indian Lok Sabha, while here the PML-N seems to have gained enough leverage with the military to seriously move the process forward. Nawaz Sharif and India’s new Prime Minister Narendra Modi met on the sidelines of Modi’s inauguration, despite reservations amongst some on our side. The question is whether they realise that neither country is blameless in the traumatic cycle of violence and repression that is the hallmark of these societies and can see the benefits that comprehensive peace and a resolution of Kashmir would bring to their people? The trajectory of past relations that has made us both prisoners of history must be recognised and addressed. A historic opportunity to do so lies before us. Let’s just try to ignore the boulder this time. *