Over the last fortnight or so, a number of meetings have been held between the government and the military to discuss the political standoff created by the Imran-Qadri marches in Islamabad. The confidence exuded by both the protest leaders and later the convergence of their strategy to lead their respective processions to the Red Zone gave the impression of a script being followed, at least until the military intervened, directing the political forces to resolve their differences through meaningful dialogue. Could this be interpreted as the latest instance of the intrusion of the military into the political sphere, given nervousness stemming from our past experiences? Reports and analyses speak of the possible shrinking of the policy space available to the incumbent government and its being confined to domestic affairs with no leverage over security, defence and foreign policy as a result of such shrinkage. About the apparent political impasse, this is not the first such instance in our history. In fact some see this as the hallmark of Pakistani politics, in which the various factions of the political class are unable to resolve differences in a reasonable manner and the impasse then almost inevitably opens the door to the military to break the logjam, more often than not at the expense of democracy. Pakistan’s history is replete with such episodes and from the way things are moving at present, it seems our desire to make such a possibility history may not be about to be fulfilled.Pakistan’s political class, despite being wary of the overweening dominance of the military, more often than not has painted itself in the past into the sort of corner that allows intervention by the military. This pattern was broken when after the Musharraf coup in 1999, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, both in exile, decided in the Charter of Democracy to close the doors to military intervention by eschewing undemocratic steps to do down rivals and let the political process flow without interruption. This commitment required sustained government-opposition relations in spite of differences. After the 2008 general elections, the leadership of PPP, PML-N and ANP conducted politics by consultation and consensus building, which helped the PPP-led coalition government to complete its tenure. However, the quest to redefine its relations with the military informed the successor Nawaz government. The dogged pursuit of Musharraf’s indictment in the treason case by the Nawaz government bought tension in civil-military relations once again. COAS General Raheel Sharif then had to step in to say that the military will preserve its dignity at all costs. It is difficult to say whether the present crisis has any link with that statement. What we do know however is that the military has in the past been able to use the fragmented nature of Pakistani politics to its advantage. This has been the underlying pattern from Ayub to Musharraf. In the presence today of an independent judiciary and free media, any straightforward intervention may not be possible, but behind the scenes creeping intrusions cannot be ruled out.Are we justified to blame the military alone for its past penchant to intervene in the political sphere? It sounds relevant to argue that professionalism demands the army to live within the limits defined in the constitution and let the political contest be solved by civilian political players. But it also sounds relevant to say that the political forces cannot perform immaturely indefinitely. This performance gap comes in handy to turn the tables against incumbent governments. It is unfortunate that just when the political forces are learning to accommodate each other and stand together in defence of democracy as the convergence of virtually all the political parties in parliament shows, a ‘spoiler brigade’ in the shape of Imran-Qadri and their supporters seem bent on wreaking as much chaos and mayhem as possible. The Imran-Qadri show will no doubt end eventually, but the damage to their political fortunes as well as the consensus emerging of adherence to the constitution and democracy may last a long time. The only beneficiary of such weakening of the democratic forces will be none other than the military, which may be seen by some, and present itself as, the only state institution with the internal cohesion and clarity to cut through the maze of our confused and conflicted polity. *