The issue of building Diamer-Bhasha dam has resurfaced as our Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, in a meeting held on Tuesday, pleaded with the president of Asian Development Bank (ADB) to finance the stalled project. The Bhasha Dam project that finally began under the last government in 2011 has undergone topsy-turvy circumstances over the years. Despite the project’s proposed site bring controversial in the first place, it is argued that the gorge where this dam is going to be built is more than appropriate and therefore it should be built on immediate basis. However, the ground reality shows more cons than pros for the project. First and foremost, the location of this impending project is sited in the forlorn inhospitable terrain of Gilgit-Baltistan, where the road infrastructure is non-existent to supply the required equipment and materials. It is an established fact and has been conceded by successive governments that even if the work goes on uninterruptedly, it will take no less than nine years to finish. Three years, at the very least, are needed to build the road and overcome the logistics barriers. From there onwards, it will take more than six years to build the structure of the dam. While keeping in mind the track record of our inefficiencies, one can only call it naive and overconfident to believe it will go smoothly. Besides the popular belief that this dam is going to solve numerous problems Pakistan is facing right now, including the energy crisis and devastating floods, the downside of building this dam usually escapes our attention. The repercussions of the project on the local habitat, if taken into account, force one to question its human cost and utility. These massive man-made artificial techniques to tame mother nature are after all not without side effects. To mention just a few, the dislocation of people living in surrounding areas and their eventual rehabilitation is a matter that takes years if not decades, even if done sincerely. People in ettlements surrounding Tarbela Dam that were affected and relocated have in some cases still not been rehabilitated after this long stretch of 40 years. How then can one rely on the words of the authorities that people displaced as a result of construction will be accommodated elsewhere? In monetary terms this project is one of the most expensive of its nature. Developing countries like Pakistan cannot afford this amount of $ 12.6 billion. Without the financial aid of big lenders like the World Bank (WB) and ADB, we cannot eembark on this project. The WB, apart from many other reasons, has changed its stance on building large dams, considering their ecological costs and damage. The environmental hazards and other ecosystem discrepancies that appear as a result of these dams are far-reaching. The tangible destruction caused by floods to agricultural lands every year , along with the financial and human losses, make us believe that floods, big or small, need to be controlled. However, a factor which is less obliging yet highly significant for the agrarian lands is the silt carried down by the flood waters. The silt beds left behind by these floods contain sediment that is highly fertile for farming purposes. Large dams in particular, like Tarbela, store silt, which exponentially reduces the life of dams. Together with this, the continuous reliance of successive Pakistani regimes on lending institutions and financial organisations to seek monetary help for development projects and later on ending up seeking more aid makes funding this project less attractive in terms of the burgeoning debt burden. Lending organisations are reluctant to assist Pakistan with huge monetary aid and urge it to make use of its domestic resources. Keeping all these factors in mind, even diplomatically we have not created a strong case to convince all concerned parties about our need for the dam or our right to build it, causing a constant delay in its construction. After the news of Nandipur power project whose initial cost was supposed to be around Rs 22 billion and has now reached Rs 84 billion due to government negligence, the ADB and WB’s reluctance is not a surprise. * Growing terrorist threat Cross-border attacks, denials of Pakistani involvement in terrorism in Afghanistan, and an operation against tribal area militants; these are familiar tropes in Pakistan’s news cycle. On the surface they appear ordinary by now. On Tuesday a group of militants from Afghanistan attacked a Frontier Constabulary (FC) border post in North Waziristan (NW). Reports say 11 militants were killed and one captured, while three FC men died. On the same day the military said it had killed 23 terrorists in airstrikes in Khyber Agency. The number of terrorists killed in the operation is now over 1,000 and military losses number near 100, according to recent ISPR statements. The ten-to-one ratio again appears positive, but when one considers the bulk of militants have escaped to other Agencies or across the border, these numbers come into perspective. This fight has not been easy or less costly despite the armed forces’ critical access to airpower and overwhelming ground support when needed. At the same time apparently random incidents of terrorism continue around the country. Karachi police yesterday killed seven terrorists in Sohrab Goth, which has long been a haven for drug and weapons smuggling. Police repelled an attack on a check post in Swabi by 12 militants; no casualties were reported after the militants melted away. The nature of these and other attacks over the summer indicate militant attempts to probe defensive preparedness. They are getting ready to go on the offensive when NATO leaves. Yet the military is still trumpeting victory. Yesterday 40 militants were reportedly killed in airstrikes in NW, while the ‘turning’ of former Punjabi Taliban chief Asmatullah Muawiya is being hailed as a sign of Zarb-e-Azb’s success. However, Muawiya’s statement that he will continue fighting in Afghanistan indicates that the policy of trying to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ militants that infuriated the US and Afghanistan is continuing. Pakistan’s sponsorship of religious extremist proxy groups is an open secret. We have used them in Kashmir and Afghanistan in pursuit of strategic goals that would have been better served using sound diplomatic strategy. After our use of proxies was exposed, it destroyed whatever diplomatic credibility and capital the country had. Afghanistan again levelled the accusation on Tuesday, which the Foreign Office (FO) rejected with ‘dismay’. Since Muawiya’s case substantiates Afghan claims, the FO’s ‘dismay’ seems filled with rank disingenuousness. What is more troubling about Muawiya is that he, like many terrorists, has switched sides before. The Taliban too were effectively out of Pakistani control by 9/11. There is no guarantee that proxies used today will not do the same if they achieve success in Afghanistan. Unlike an elected Afghan government, they will not adhere to the system of international law. It would be far wiser to work above board with a government in Afghanistan that may become friendly if we help it, than to rely on proxies whose ideological proclivities will eventually turn them against us and towards pan-Islamic radical groups like the Islamic State. *