Pakistan’s war against extremism is being waged internally against terrorist abettors in state institutions and externally against terrorist infrastructure in the tribal areas. Two separate incidents on Wednesday highlighted just how precariously balanced the conflict remains. The Foreign Office (FO) said that two Pakistani border posts in Bajaur Agency — Manozangal and Moukha tops — were attacked by terrorists from Afghanistan early in the morning. The FO said it expected the Kabul authorities to take concrete steps to “stop the use of its territory against Pakistan”. This is ironic mimicry of Afghan protests over the last decade that Pakistan-based militants were attacking Afghanistan. Kabul’s writ in its eastern provinces is even more tenuous than Pakistan’s hold on the tribal belt. The prospect of cross-border raids will only increase after NATO and US troops pull out of Afghanistan at the end of this year. With the head of the Pakistani Taliban, Mullah Fazlullah, in Afghanistan and with militants from the tribal areas reportedly fleeing there in numbers, the strategy of striking from territory that Pakistan cannot legally enter will become more enticing for the terrorists. The trust deficit between Kabul and Islamabad is likely to hamper any concerted offensive in the foreseeable future, hence dictating militant capabilities are shattered as an existential necessity. News from the home front was equally disturbing; two Lieutenant Colonels presumably linked with intelligence agencies were killed in a suicide attack near Islamabad. They were travelling in a white unmarked vehicle, which is the hallmark of intelligence operatives. The vehicle apparently slowed down as it neared a railway crossing where numerous beggars scrape a living, when a suicide bomber disguised as a beggar approached and blew himself up, killing the officers and three others. That the terrorists knew the route and timing of the vehicle’s arrival shows a level of intelligence that cannot be acquired without inside information. The problem of terrorist sympathisers in the security apparatus is an old one. One may recall the assassination attempt on former president Pervez Musharraf in which several army and air force officers were implicated. After that the army said it purged its ranks of soldiers with extremist ties. However, the problem clearly remains. The attacks on PNS Mehran in Karachi, Kamra Airbase, GHQ Rawalpindi, and the murder of Brigadier Moinudin Ahmed in Islamabad speak to how severe it is. One expected after these attacks that anyone suspected of such ties would be investigated, but it appears this is still a work-in-progress. One also expects that since travelling in white, unmarked vehicles has become associated with intelligence operatives, they would find alternate means and manner of travel. These attacks raise serious questions about the strategic thinking of the security apparatus. Both are the end result of a 40-year-old proxy strategy that created armed militants and in turn radicalised members of the armed forces. The fallout from that policy is now being borne by the armed forces themselves, as well as citizens. *