The attack on the district courts in Islamabad yesterday, which killed 12 people and injured 35 more, comes just a day after the government announced that it will only respond to attacks by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) after the group agreed to a one month ceasefire. The TTP spokesperson immediately denied responsibility for the attack, though media reports have emerged of a TTP splinter group called Ahrarul Hind claiming responsibility. The massacre of 12 polio vaccination workers in Khyber just hours before the ceasfire anouncement was also denied by the TTP, though the armed forces reportedly took out the particular militants responsible. It appears that ceasefire or not, attacks will continue. Which begs the point, if the TTP can’t control or negotiate for its various factions, or if numerous groups remain outside its umbrella, then ipso facto negotiations are pointless. And irrespective of their denials, creating public confusion and fostering scepticism about the government’s objectives and legitimacy are as important to militant groups as militarily attacking the state. The question is, how many more civilians will pay the price for the government’s pursuit of a negotiated settlement, particularly since there has been no let up in attacks. The ceasefire announcement only came after the armed forces aggressively targeted terrorist and militant infrastructure in the tribal areas, when it seemed negotiations were at a dead end. The government left the door open for any militant groups that wanted to negotiate, but by promising only to retaliate, the government may have gone too far in trying to appear serious about peace. The policy of retaliatory strikes is fundamentally flawed since it requires almost perfect intelligence about the source and planning of terrorist attacks, while sweeping the militants’ past atrocities under the carpet. Announcing a ceasefire while denying any future attacks is a clever way for the TTP to continue talking even as ‘splinter groups’ continue fighting. The TTP must be brought to justice, not for any future attacks they may have planned, but for the thousands of civilians and law enforcement personnel killed in the last few years. The policy should be to hit the terrorists so hard that we prevent all future attacks, anywhere, ever. In this regard, the section of the National Security Policy detailing reform of extremist madrassahs is very important. The government should not assume that by giving the TTP a bloody nose they have knocked them down; they should instead prepare for the worst — a wave of terrorism in the uban areas — and aggressively destroy the militants’ infrastructure while leaving the door open to those militant groups — and only those groups — who lay down their arms and submit to the state for judgement of their crimes. A tit-for-tat policy will only prolong the inevitable. *