The military operation in North Waziristan (NW) entered a critical phase on Monday as troops began a ground assault in the former terrorist strongholds of Miranshah and Mir Ali, with tanks supporting infantry and SSG commandos conducting house-to-house searches for terrorists and civilians left behind. Military officials say that 15 terrorists were killed in Monday’s assault and 376 have been killed since June 15 when the offensive got underway with air strikes; 17 soldiers have died so far. We are now committed, though according to former ISPR DG Major General Athar Abbas, we should have committed in 2010 when COAS General Ashfaq Kiyani had the choice to continue into NW after the operation in South Waziristan (SW) ended. In a statement, General Abbas said the former COAS was reluctant because he felt the operation might show him and the army in a bad light. While this may seem insipid and uninspiring, it shows how important political consensus is for an internal military operation, particularly when the terrorists have mainstream sympathisers. Meanwhile the Pakistan Protection Bill was passed by the Senate on Monday. The Bill gives law enforcement agencies wide powers of search, seizure, captivity, and even allows them to shoot suspects on sight. The amendments made by the opposition notwithstanding, one wonders how the Senate saw fit to pass this Bill after the incident in Model Town unmasked the brutality and unprofessionalism of the police. The security agencies already operate under a shroud of impunity and one can only hope that giving the police greater powers will not endanger the public more. Operation Zarb-e-Azb has widespread public support (polls say 72 percent of people have confidence in the military). However, the operation is not without pitfalls and some of them may appear when the military assault phase is completed. Pakistanis are largely aware that failed security policies are the root cause of terrorism and extremism. The rejection of extremist narratives by the public led to support for military action, particularly after terrorists murdered civilians and prisoners and began attacking vital infrastructure. The damage to the country’s painstakingly built infrastructure, from airports to grid stations, was a source of anger, worry and disillusionment. The effect on the lives of ordinary people became obvious and they rejected the militant ideology, seeing where it would lead. Be that as it may, the operation needs to develop a counter-narrative to the extremists’ ideology. The political and civil structures needed to bring NW specifically and FATA in general into the mainstream cannot be developed by the army alone but must be built through civilian institutional arrangements. The government’s performance must improve on what happened in Swat, where the military perforce has had to manage because the civilian follow-up has been so lacklustre. Most of the reconstruction work is funded and led by donor agencies or NGOs. Swat is still recovering economically and socially from the Taliban affliction five years ago, when many people saw the destruction of their property and most importantly the ravaging of their lives and culture. Unless these problems are addressed adequately in the wake of a military offensive by civilian institutional intervention, the fear among development experts is the trauma of war could lead to social anarchy and a cycle of intra-community reprisals. To stop this possible development, an approach that combines education, the media, cultural activities and functioning justice could help reinvigorate the values that once made Swat such a picturesque valley. The same applies to NW. As events over the last few days have shown, it is easy for the country to slide into anarchy. The government did the right thing by reaching out for security cooperation to regional partners like China, Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, but has been conspicuous by its absence domestically in terms of policy leadership since the operation started. Its post-operation plans are seemingly non-existent. This is the time for Nawaz Sharif and his cabinet to lead and own the security paradigm and the counter-narrative that must develop after the military finishes its current tasks in NW. *