The funeral of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi leader (LeJ) Malik Ishaq, who died in a police shootout on Wednesday, was marked with violent protests by militants of the banned outfit. According to district police officer Tariq Mastoi, “Protesters tried to damage a Shia mosque and private properties and attacked police with stones” in Ishaq’s hometown of Rahim Yar Khan, as the bodies of 14 LeJ affiliates arrived for burial. To the credit of the local police department, it was able to deploy enough police officers (about 5,000) in time to limit the damage and casualties. A few hours later in Gujrat, militants attacked a police post and a gun battle ensued that led to the deaths of two of the assailants and seriously injured two police officers. The police has been ordered to arrest the protestors and any suspected LeJ militants wreaking havoc in the area. Muhammad Mumtaz, another key LeJ leader, who was wanted in several target killings, was killed in the Gujrat incident. It does seem that most of the LeJ’s top leadership has been killed off, and the group will have trouble reorganising. This incident shows that simply killing off the leadership of a militant organisation cannot always eradicate it. The remaining terrorist cells can continue their attacks under new leadership, or join a different militant group. In Operation Zarb-e-Azb, for example, hundreds of militants have been killed but many have fled, some across the border to Afghanistan. Though beaten back for the time being, these organisations might resurge in the country in the future. Events such as the LeJ members’ attempts to avenge their leader raise questions as to whether the military operations against terrorists will result in a complete eradication of the terrorist and sectarian groups that have become so entrenched in various parts of Pakistan. Although the killing of both Ishaq in the crossfire that followed when the convoy transporting him was attacked by LeJ militants and Mumtaz were defensive reactions by the police, they reflect the inability of our justice system in dealing with terrorist cases. The Anti-Terrorism Courts were set up for the very purpose of trying and putting away terrorists expediently, yet they have not proved to be effective and Pakistan is becoming more and more reliant on the security forces to re-establish and maintain peace in the country. The reactions of the LeJ and other proscribed organisations to the ongoing military operations against them, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s attack on the Army Public School in December 2014, suggest that Pakistan’s war against terrorism may last longer than anticipated. Even after the operations are over, law enforcement will have to remain vigilant on the security situation of the country and will have to secure the borders to prevent the resurgence of these groups. *