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Op-ed: Fighting a mindset, not just terrorism —Ejaz Haider

Musharraf’s job is much tougher than he thinks. Until he began to change the thrust of Pakistan’s traditional national security policies, the principal contradiction was between the army and the civil society. Given the threat to his life not just from the outside but from the inside, he must realise that the principal contradiction has shifted

It is good to see General Pervez Musharraf standing firm and unruffled despite two attacks on his life within a span of eleven days. This shows the man has both courage and panache. But the issue has more to it than Musharraf’s physical courage. Given the eccentricity of the situation, Musharraf’s fall could mean major trouble for Pakistan.

Some things are obvious, including the strong possibility of an inside track in the last two attempts. Someone desperately wants to remove Musharraf from the scene and make space for elements that are very unhappy with three broad policy strands pushed by him: the about-face on Afghanistan (Musharraf’s decision to ditch the Taliban and ally Pakistan with the US effort against Al Qaeda); the peace overtures towards India (seen as a sell-out and Pakistan buckling under US-Indian pressure); finally, the damage-control measures following charges of proliferation of nuclear-weapons technology (the decision to sideline some top scientists and interrogate them is being seen in some quarters as compromising Pakistan’s nuclear security).

What binds the three strands is the string of ideology based on the notion of civilisational clash. General Musharraf has committed apostasy by leaving the Muslim brethren in the lurch and joining hands with the ‘infidel’. The slogan, ‘Pakistan-first’, does not jibe with the concept of the ummah, which looks at the state as a secondary entity. What is important are religio-ideological ties that bind the Muslims worldwide, not territorial states. The ummah is an ahistorical concept; so is the effort to purge Islam of the historical accretions (bida’) and restore it to its pristine glory and purity. It is impossible to disprove the ummah thesis on the basis of historical evidence since the concept is not situated in history.

Lurking just below the surface, Islam has always had an anarchic streak, legitimised on the basis of Amr and Nahi. Al-Ghazali tried to shift the responsibility for Amr and Nahi to the state. He argued, sensibly, that the practice of Amr and Nahi at the private level could create chaos: hence it must be the preserve of the state. But here one runs into another problem. What is the nature of the state in Islam? Does the state enjoy innate sovereignty or merely surrogates for God’s Sovereignty (Hakmiyat-e Illahiya)? If the state is not endogenously sovereign, as Islamic literature maintains, then there is a problem. What happens if a group decides that the state is not Islamic enough; or that it is seen to be militating against the interests of Islam and the Muslims? If the state loses its legitimacy as the true surrogate of Allah, the responsibility vested in it for that reason — derived rather than innate — would pass on to the individual or a group.

Of course, historically, the Muslim states have acted no differently than ‘secular’ states. This is clear from Caliph Ali’s campaigns as also the way the prophet’s (pbuh) grandson was treated (a great treatise on this and related topics is Maulana Maududi’s Khilafat ‘o Malukiat). But the idea has its conceptual roots in the way the state is juridically constituted and the manner in which Amr and Nahi are centrally placed in the life of a Muslim society.

The two concepts in tandem have proved extremely problematic in reconciling with the concept of a modern state. Internally, democracy is incompatible with an Islamic state in the presence of these two concepts — the state has to be conceived in ahistorical terms, based on eternal principles, rather than as an evolving entity. As Vali Reza Nasr wrote about Maududi’s concept of the state: “The state [is] neither democratic nor authoritarian, for it [has] no need to govern in the Western sense of the term... In a polity in which there [are] no grievances and both the government and the citizenry [abide] by the same infallible and inviolable divine law, there [can] be no problems with the democratic rights and procedures.” In other words, given the same frame of reference on both sides — state and society — defined in terms of divine law, neither would have reason to be in conflict since “Concern for that kind of government [can only be] generated by crises of governability and legitimacy.” [Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism,” p-85]

Historically, such harmony has never existed in the world of Islam at any time, which has seen many dissenting or, as in the present case, millenarian movements. But the issue keeps recrudescing. This is why it is important for Musharraf to take the threat to his life very seriously. While no group has so far claimed responsibility for the attacks, the Al Qaeda signature is fairly obvious. But it is important to define Al Qaeda. The Al Qaeda inner core, the Bin Laden loyalists and confidants, may have been badly damaged because of the killing and capture of many of the group’s top leaders, but its two outer rings remain largely intact. The circle just outside the inner core comprises myriad groups inside Pakistan and across the Muslim world; most of their activists have had experience of fighting in Afghanistan and their ability to network has greatly increased over the years. There is evidence that the Al Qaeda inner core is sub-contracting operations to local groups. The outermost circle involves all those Muslims who sympathise with Bin Laden’s mission, one way or another, are anti-American, and look at the ongoing war as a war on Islam, a modern crusade. While the majority in this circle is unlikely to have the physical courage to actually commit acts of terror, many can be useful in terms of facilitating and financing operations conducted by the middle circle.

But more than this, it is the growing numbers in the outermost circle that could, potentially, turn the tide whenever Muslim societies open up enough to embrace democracy. At that point they are likely to impact the ballot in ways harmful to the spirit of democracy as reflected in constitutional liberalism. The bigger success of Al Qaeda would be to make effective use of — by creating propitious conditions — the increasing numbers of such ideologically motivated people. It will have morphed into a movement.

Musharraf’s job is much tougher than he thinks. Until he began to change the thrust of Pakistan’s traditional national security policies, the principal contradiction was between the army and the civil society. Given the threat to his life not just from the outside but from the inside, he must realise that the principal contradiction has shifted from civil-military to the liberal-reactionary divide. The liberal elements within the army and in the civil society will now have a face-off with the reactionary elements within the army and the civil society.

At a minimum, this calls for a review of Musharraf’s domestic political policies and alignments and the military’s role in politics. Musharraf has shown himself to be a brilliant tactician; he now has to deliver as a strategist.

Ejaz Haider is News Editor of The Friday Times and Foreign Editor of Daily Times

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