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Musharraf, Bush, in state of ‘cautious compromise’

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: A crisis in US-Pakistan relations is brewing just beneath the surface despite expressions of unity in the war against Al Qaeda, according to Stratfor, a news and analysis service available through subscription.

The analysis by George Friedman and Kamran Bokhari asserts that cooperation at the operational and tactical levels between the two countries is nearly nonexistent and calculated interference by Pakistani intelligence and security elements is hindering US operations in the country. The two researchers note that on the surface, Musharraf and Bush are in a state of “cautious compromise” with Washington continuing to express confidence in the former’s government and offering increased military assistance to his country.

Pakistan has acknowledged the involvement of foreign forces in the counter terrorism offensive but claims that joint efforts are limited to intelligence-sharing and logistics cooperation, thus defusing both US pressure to act and domestic pressure to do the contrary.

Friedman and Bokhari write that despite the political niceties, two key issues continue to impede efforts to dismantle the Al Qaeda structure in Pakistan: professional rivalry between US security and intelligence agencies and the “dismal” performance of the Pakistani security and intelligence outfits.

Of late, certain US officials have been making a public issue of Pakistan’s “non-cooperation,” among them CIA Director Porter Goss, who insinuated a few months ago that bin Laden is known to be in Pakistan and for him to be captured, certain “weak links” - reference to Pakistan - must be strengthened.

The two analysts contend that there is an “ingrained distrust” of US and other foreign services within Pakistan’s intelligence community. Officials don’t like the idea of US pressure against their government, while others dislike being told how to do their jobs. Still others see the United States as arrogantly pursuing its own interests at Pakistan’s expense. There is a great deal of resentment at all levels over what Pakistani perceives as Washington’s failure to recognise the efforts, sacrifices, and cooperation it is providing.

There is also the view that the US will abandon Pakistan as it abandoned Afghanistan in the 1980s. The authors assert, “Sources in Pakistan tell us that the Inter-Services Intelligence and Military Intelligence agencies debrief all private Pakistani citizens who come into contact with US government, media and think tanks … in attempts to restrict contact between the two countries to official channels. Additionally, certain high-level leaders of Pakistani militant Islamist movements have been declared off-limits as targets for security forces, thus leaving key segments of the international militant network unmolested. The United States is providing large amounts of supplies, money and training for Pakistani forces, but with few results.”

Friedman and Bokhari believe that the Musharraf regime does not have tight control over its own intelligence and security services. The military would like to hide its past links with the militants and its current ties to certain Islamist groups, which it views as assets of the state to be used in pursuit of its geopolitical goals. Pakistan is not willing to surrender this leverage lightly and, because the lines between those “useful” militant groups and Al Qaeda members can be blurry, many on Islamabad’s preservation list fall into both categories.

Islamabad believes that Pakistan’s importance as a US ally is likely to dissolve if Bin Laden is captured or killed. Washington has been attempting to strengthen its ties with India and is even trying tentative negotiations with Iran, with the eventual goal of warmer relations. Should these efforts bear fruit, the Musharraf regime’s geopolitical importance to the United States will diminish, leaving the regime as a potential member of the “outposts of tyranny” rather than a close anti-terrorism ally.

The two analysts believe that this situation cannot last indefinitely and the breaking point will come either with a misstep by Gen Musharraf that destroys the political balance he has tried to maintain within Pakistan, or a decision by Washington that delay, obfuscation and overt obstructionism will no longer be tolerated. The question that arises, the two analysts argue, is whether Gen Musharraf is in control of the “obstructionism” in the terrorism war or a victim of it. “We believe the reality is somewhere in the middle. Nevertheless, the outlook is troubling,” they add.

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