Nothing new on Pakistan in Clinton book

By Khalid Hasan
Washington: Those who were expecting President Bill Clinton’s memoir released this week to contain dramatic disclosures about Pakistan or India will be disappointed as there is nothing in the book that is not already public knowledge.

Clinton describes Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington in the wake of the Kargil war, his in-and-out trip to Pakistan and the fruitless attempt earlier to nuke Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders.

The former President mentions the overthrow of the Nawaz Sharif government by the army in a detached way, expressing little regret over the demise of an elected government. Nor does he make any mention of the role he played in Nawaz Sharif’s release from prison and his dispatch to Saudi Arabia along with several members of his family, whereas this correspondent has authentic information that it was Clinton’s personal intervention with the Saudis that secured Nawaz Sharif’s release (see report in Daily Times).

This is how Clinton describes Nawaz Sharif’s overthrow: “On October 12 (1999), Pakistan’s prime minister Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a military coup headed by General Musharraf, who had led the Pakistani armed forces over the Line of Control in Kashmir. I was concerned about the loss of democracy, and urged the restoration of civilian rule as soon as possible. Musharraf’s ascendancy had one immediate consequence: the programme to send Pakistani commandos into Afghanistan to catch or kill Osama bin Laden was cancelled.”

Earlier, the US had begun to train 60 Pakistani troops as commandos to go into Afghanistan to get bin Laden. The president writes, “I was skeptical about the project; even if Sharif wanted to help, the Pakistani military was full of Taliban and al Qaeda sympathisers. But I thought we had nothing to lose be exploring every option.”

Clinton also provides an account of how the Pakistanis were informed of the cruise missile strike against Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. The camps that were struck, the former President points out, were also used by the Pakistani intelligence service to “train the Taliban and insurgents who fought in Kashmir.” The US did not want to take Pakistan into confidence about the missile attack on bin Laden’s suspected hideout because, in Clinton’s words, “it was likely that Pakistani intelligence would warn the Taliban and insurgents who fought in Kashmir.” It was, therefore, decided to send the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joe Ralston, to have dinner with “the top Pakistani military commander at the time the attacks were scheduled. Ralston would tell him what was happening a few minutes before our missiles invaded Pakistani airspace, too late to alert the Taliban or al Qaeda, but in time to avoid having them shot down or sparking a counterattack on India” under the impression that the missiles were coming from India. Clinton writes that he was “deeply concerned” about India’s nuclear tests in 1998 and “urged” Nawaz Sharif not to follow suit but “he couldn’t resist the political pressure.

Clinton provides the following description of Nawaz Sharif’s July 1999 visit to Washington.

“Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan called and asked if he could come to Washington on July 4 to discuss the dangerous standoff with India that had begun several weeks earlier when Pakistani forces under the command of General Pervez Musharraf crossed the Line of Control, which had been recognised and generally observed boundary between India and Pakistan in Kashmir since 1972. Sharif was concerned that the situation Pakistan had created was getting out of control, and he hoped to use my good offices not only to resolve the crisis but also to help mediate with the Indians on the question of Kashmir itself.

Even before the crisis, Sharif asked me to help in Kashmir, saying it was as worthy of my attention as the Middle East and Northern Ireland. I had explained to him then that the United States was involved in those peace processes because both sides wanted us. In this case, India had strongly refused the involvement of any outside party.”

Clinton goes on to point out that “Sharif’s moves were perplexing because that February, Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had travelled to Lahore, Pakistan, to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the Kashmir problem and other differences. By crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had wrecked the talks. I didn’t know whether Sharif had authorised the invasion or had simply allowed it in order to avoid a confrontation with Pakistan’s powerful military. Regardless, he had gotten himself into a bind with no easy way out.”

Clinton told Nawaz Sharif that he was always welcome in Washington, “even on July 4,” but if he wanted to come on that day he had to understand two things. First, he had to agree to withdraw his troops back across the Line of Control; and second, “I would not agree to intervene in the Kashmir dispute, especially under circumstances that appeared to reward Pakistan’s wrongful incursion.” The Pakistani leader told the President that he wanted to come “anyway” and on July 4, 1999, the two met at Blair House in Washington. “Once more, Sharif urged me to intervene in Kashmir, and again I explained that without India’s consent it would be counterproductive, but that I would urge Vajpayee to resume the bilateral dialogue if the Pakistani troops withdrew. He agreed, and we released a joint statement saying steps would be taken to restore the Line of Control and that I would support and encourage the resumption and intensification of bilateral talks once the violence had stopped.”

Clinton writes that after the July 4 meeting he felt that Nawaz Sharif had perhaps come in order to use pressure from the United States to provide himself “cover for ordering his military to defuse the conflict,” adding, “I knew he was on shaky ground at home, and I hoped he would survive, because I needed his cooperation in the fight against terrorism.”

It may be noted that Clinton wanted Sharif to survive not for the sake of Pakistani remaining under civilian control but because he needed the Pakistani leader in the “fight against terrorism.” The former President writes that he had asked Sharif on three earlier occasions for help in apprehending Osama bin Laden, as the US had intelligence reports that bin Laden was planning attacks on American facilities and personnel. He warned Sharif in the July 4 meeting that “unless he did more to help, I would have to announce that Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan.”

Of his flying visit to Islamabad, Clinton writes that the Secret Service considered the trip “most dangerous” which was why two planes, one unmarked in which the President rode, were flown to Pakistan. An area of one mile around the landing strip had been cleared by the Pakistani security so that no shoulder-fired missile at the presidential aircraft. He goes over the main points he made in his speech over Pakistan state television rounding it off with a reference to General Musharraf.

He writes, “In my meetings with Musharraf, I saw why he had emerged from the complex, often violent culture of Pakistani politics. He was clearly intelligent, strong, and sophisticated. If he chose to pursue a peaceful, progressive path, I thought he had a fair chance to succeed, but I told him I though terrorism would eventually destroy Pakistan from within if he didn’t move against it. Musharraf said he didn’t believe Sharif could be executed, but he was non-committal on the other issues. I knew he was still trying to solidify his position and was in a tough spot. Sharif subsequently was released into exile in Jedda, Saudi Arabia. When Musharraf began serious cooperation with the United States in the war against terror after September 11, 2991, it remained a risky course for him. In 2003, he survived two assassination attempts within day of each other.”

In the sole reference to Benazir Bhutto who visited Washington in 1995, Clinton calls her, along with Turkish prime minister of the time, Tansu Ciller, “two intelligent, very modern women leaders of Muslim countries.”