Musharraf, the ‘poor man’s Ataturk’

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: A new book describes President Pervez Musharraf as a “master of half measures and the poor man’s Ataturk.” The just published Pakistan’s ‘Drift into Extremism: Allah, the army and America’s war on terror’ by Hassan Abbas, a former Pakistani police officer, calls the President “a man of many parts” who is “amiable and easy to like, but if crossed he is quick to roll up his sleeves and grit his death.”

The author bases his assessment, he writes, on several interviews conducted with Gen Musharraf’s friends and associates. According to them, “The threshold of his ‘diplomacy’ is low and what he feels shows clearly on his countenance. His patriotism and sincerity are palpable and so is his unpretentiousness. He would rather avoid pomp and ceremony, but if it is laid out for him, he is not too uncomfortable with it. Throughout his military career, he has enjoyed a reputation of being crisp and to the point, and of being far removed from mendacity. He is not one who is amenable to threats and pressure, which immediately bring out his truculence to the fore, but friendship is likely to draw out of him all he possesses. He is not a man of striking intelligence or learning, but is sharper than most. He is a polite and cultured man, and even when angry, which is often, he will not leave the bounds of propriety. He is not a religious man though he takes pride in being a Muslim. He also does mind scotch on the rocks, though he is not known to sacrifice his deportment to the influence of liquor, With all this, like Napoleon’s marshals, he is lucky.”

The author describes President Musharraf’s method of dealing with the problems of his friends as “revolutionary” as on such occasions, he will “cut through the red tape of convention,” but when it comes to dealing with larger national problems, “he will supply conventional solutions.” According to the Abbas, “His poor judgement of men combined with prejudice against real and imagined adversaries has, in practical terms, served to restrict Pakistan’s already narrow human resource base, sot that incompetent ‘friends’ have been inflicted on important offices for which many a competent ‘adversary’ was better suited. With this, the increasing intolerance for the person who disagrees with his position has shut him off from the contrary view and closed his window to all but a one-sided perspective of reality … Musharraf does not have the ability to fire the lax and the laggard as long as they continue making the right noises in his presence and in concert with appropriate gestures of due servility.”

Abbas has managed to procure a letter written by Maj. Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik to his younger brother Lt. Gen Abdul Ali Malik in November 1967 from Turkey about the 1965 war. He writes that the de facto command changed the very first day of operations after the fall of Chamb when Brig. Azmat Hyat under orders from Gen Yahya Khan broke off wireless communications with him. He writes that he reasoned and pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take overall command but let him go up to Akhnur as his “subordinate,” but Yahya refused. “We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually, it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through,” Gen Malik adds.

Gen Malik also discloses that it was his decision not to inform pro-Kashmiri elements in the Valley of Operation Gibraltar as “I was not willing to compromise on this in any event. And the whole op. could be made stillborn by just one double agent.” He believes that if he had been allowed to take Akhnur, the full value of Operation Gibraltar would have been enchased. He also confirms that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto “kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I, however, was certain that Gibraltar would lead to was and told GHQ so Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case, whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.”

Gen Malik tells his brother that he has decided not to write a book about the 1965 war. He writes, “The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pakistan and we will need all we have to save the situation. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.”

Gen Malik also writes, “And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact, it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to bypass Musa while Gibraltar etc, was being planned. I was dealing more with him and (Gen) Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM (Bhutto)’s heart gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!”

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