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Op-ed: Strained Pak-Afghan relationship

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Pakistan should play a more active role in the reconstruction and economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan so as to consolidate the goodwill that exists for Pakistan at the level of the common Afghans

Recent armed clashes between Pakistan’s regular troops and the militias of local Afghan tribal chiefs across the Durand Line in the Mohmand Agency revived the spectre of trouble that often characterised Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the pre-1979 period. The Afghan militia commanders accused the Pakistan Army of establishing its posts in Afghan territory; some of them claimed that Pakistani troops had penetrated about 30 miles into Afghanistan. Surprisingly the Kabul government, including President Hamid Karzai, accepted the claims of the militia commanders and issued strident statements against Pakistan.

Kabul, Kandahar and some other cities witnessed anti-Pakistan demonstrations led by people holding important position in the Afghanistan government. One such protest march ransacked the Pakistan embassy in Kabul. Though President Hamid Karzai expressed regret over the attack on the embassy and the Afghan government paid for the damage caused, the fact of the matter is that the hostility shown towards Pakistan was unprecedented.

Peace and stability in Afghanistan and cordial relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are in the best interests of the latter. It is therefore important to review Pakistan’s current Afghanistan policy so that such incidents can be averted in the future.

Pakistan’s current Afghanistan policy can be traced back to September 2001, when Pakistan turned its back on the Taliban government in Kabul after the terrorist attacks in two US cities. Until these terrorist attacks, Pakistan was an ardent supporter of the Taliban regime which was described as the best bet for Pakistan in the strife-torn Afghanistan.

But Pakistan decided to abandon the Taliban government and join the US-led global effort to combat transnational terrorism. This reflected a realistic assessment of the post-9/11 international scene. The US and other western states held Al Qaeda responsible for the terrorist attacks and, as its top leadership was based in Afghanistan, the Taliban faced the wrath of the world community.

Pakistan coordinated its Afghanistan policy with the US strategy of counter terrorism through the use of military power and coercion. Three airports were made available to the US troops for logistical, communication and emergency support for their military operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan; the security agencies of Pakistan and the US exchanged information on Afghanistan; and Pakistan strengthened its security arrangements on Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

U.S military authorities continued to assign priority to law and order and security issues in Afghanistan after dislodging the Taliban and the installation of the Karzai government in December 2001. Some attention was paid to Afghanistan’s reconstruction after the conference for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, held at Tokyo in January 2002. However, American focus was on security and the arrest of Al Qaeda and Taliban elements that had dispersed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The periodic attacks on the allied, especially American, troops in Afghanistan convinced US policy makers that they need to hunt for Taliban and Al Qaeda activists.

Pakistan was willing to agree with the US security perspective on Afghanistan, and extended all possible cooperation to US military authorities to pursue their security-dominated agenda. Initially, the US demanded that its troops based in Afghanistan should be free to enter Pakistan’s tribal areas in hot pursuit of Taliban and Al Qaeda activists who were said to have taken refuge in Pakistan’s tribal areas and were re-grouping there. The US also pressed Pakistan to enhance internal security for capturing the elements that had moved to Pakistani cities to save themselves from US military operations in Afghanistan.

Pakistan did not the US troops a free hand in the tribal areas but gradually moved its regular troops to the Afghan border. The last tribal area directly penetrated by the Pakistan Army in June 2003 was the Mohmand Agency. This ‘forward’ policy disrupted the trans-border tribal linkages across the Durand Line which adversely affected economic and social interaction, including smuggling and related activities, among the Pakhtun tribes, especially those settled on the Afghan side of the border.

After making an unsuccessful bid to take on Pakistani Army personnel, the Afghan tribal leaders raised the sovereignty issue, accusing Pakistani troops of capturing Afghan territory. This dragged the Karzai government into the controversy. Given the beleaguered nature of the Karzai government in Afghanistan’s domestic context, it issued strident statements against Pakistan to deflect domestic pressure.

Two elements took advantage of the situation. The Northern Alliance in the Afghan government and outside entertains strong reservations about Pakistan due to the latter’s support for the Taliban in the pre-September 2001 period. Furthermore, as Tajik and Uzbek (mainly Northern Alliance) are over-represented in Afghanistan’s power structure at the expense of Pakhtuns, they think that greater Pakistani influence with the Afghan government might work to the advantage of the Pakhtuns.

These elements availed of the border clashes to demonstrate resentment against Pakistan in Afghanistan and to pressurise Karzai domestically.

Pakistan made a sensible decision to deal with the problems with Afghanistan diplomatically. The recent dialogue between the two countries and the meetings of the tripartite commission, recently set up for reviewing the border problem, have defused the situation. However, the possibility of the Afghan tribal leaders and the Northern Alliance playing up this issue again or similar ones in the future cannot be ruled out.

Pakistan’s policy makers need to come out of the shadow of US security-oriented perspective on Afghanistan. The current cooperation for tracking Taliban and Al Qaeda activists may continue in the tribal areas and other regions of Pakistan. However, the Afghan situation calls for going beyond the security and law and order approach.

Pakistan’s official circles often talk of India’s negative role in Afghanistan. But, for ordinary Afghans, India has been more forthcoming than Pakistan in providing humanitarian assistance and relief. India is not simply setting up its diplomatic outposts and appointing RAW agents in Afghanistan, it is undertaking a host of positive actions to create a foothold for itself after being discredited in the country for supporting the former Soviet Union in the eighties.

Pakistan should play a more active role in the reconstruction and economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan so as to consolidate the goodwill that exists for Pakistan at the level of the common people in Afghanistan. In 2002, Pakistan committed $ 100 million dollars for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. So far, Pakistan has made only 15 to 20 per cent of this amount available to Afghanistan. The government of Pakistan is strong in rhetoric and weak in action so far as Afghanistan’s economic rehabilitation and reconstruction is concerned.

Pakistan should provide assistance in education, healthcare, agriculture (especially fruits and food grains), communications and transportation, road construction and telephone systems, and capacity-building of government and non-government institutions and organisations. Pakistan can strengthen healthcare arrangements by providing medicine and hospital equipment, and help set up new dispensaries or re-equip existing ones in different regions.

This will enable Pakistan to make its presence felt in Afghanistan with reference to human and social development and humanitarian activities. The ordinary Afghans should feel that Pakistan can help improve the quality of life for them

Earlier this month Pakistan offered some additional concessions to Afghanistan for transit trade and promised to extend technical assistance in banking and postal services and related areas. Hopefully, the government of Pakistan will implement these offers quickly and adopt a more outgoing approach to help the common Afghans overcome their socio-economic problems.

Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

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