Share this story!            

The ultimatum to Iraq

Najmuddin A Shaikh

The Americans are also hoping that in the next few days the Turkish Parliament will reverse its earlier decision and permit the stationing of American assault forces in Turkey. No matter what the Americans have been saying about their ability to go ahead even without Turkish cooperation there is no doubt that there can be no “fast clean operation” without access to Northern Iraq through Turkey. This means that troops will not be positioned in Turkey for another two weeks or so

The Security Council debate on March 7 reflected, as expected, the disagreement of the majority of the Council members with the American plan to declare Iraq in material breach and authorise implicitly the use of military force by the Americans and whoever they could persuade to be part of the “Coalition of the Willing” to disarm Iraq. The dissent, expressed with varying degrees of intensity, was led by France, Russia and China, all permanent members of the Security Council, and was echoed by a number of the non-permanent members. All of them argued, on the basis of the reports presented by Dr. Hans Blix and Dr. Mohamed Al-Baradie, that the inspection process was moving ahead and that more time should be granted to the inspectors to complete the peaceful disarmament of Iraq.

It was apparent, even before the council session commenced that the resolution tabled by the USA, UK and Spain and the operative paragraph of which said baldly “that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in Resolution 1441” had no chance of being passed. In the course of his speech Foreign Secretary Jack Straw announced that the UK along with the co-sponsors was now tabling another resolution, the most important operative paragraph of which reads as follows “DECIDES that Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by resolution 1441 (2002) unless, on or before March 17, 2003, the Council concludes that Iraq has demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation in accordance with its disarmament obligations under resolution 1441 (2002) and previous relevant resolutions, and is yielding possession to UNMOVIC and the IAEA of all weapons, weapon delivery and support systems and structures, prohibited by resolution 687 (1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and all information regarding prior destruction of such items...”

Since it was clear from the nature of the debate, the stated positions of the opponents of the American position and the report of the inspectors that such a short deadline would not be acceptable the question that arises is why was this put forward. Before examining this question it would also to be interesting to see what it was in the inspectors’ reports and evaluations that gave heart to the opponents and what the Americans could say in response.

Dr. Mohamed Al-Baradie categorically asserted that, given time, he would be able, even in current circumstances, to state with certitude whether or not Iraq was free of a weapons oriented nuclear programme. He dismissed coolly and calmly the allegations levelled against Iraq about the import of uranium from Niger and the import of aluminium tubes for the construction of centrifuges. In what could be seen as an effort to rebut the conclusions of the inspectors, Secretary Colin Powell maintained that, “As we all know, in 1991 the IAEA was just days away from determining that Iraq did not have a nuclear program. We soon found out otherwise. IAEA is now reaching a similar conclusion, but we have to be very cautious”. Powell also suggested that the question of aluminium tubes could not be dismissed out of hand since it was known from the suppliers that the specifications Iraq had prescribed were at least 50 per cent stricter than those needed for tubes used in artillery.

Dr. Hans Blix, as befitting a report on issues of much greater complexity, was more equivocal in terms of what could be achieved with the present level of cooperation but he did say that “Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.”

Powell’s statement included the following passage which could be construed as the American response: “We’ve been down this road before. In March 1998, Saddam Hussein was also faced with the threat of military action. He responded with promises, promises to provide inspectors at that time with immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access. The then-chief inspector reported to this council a new spirit of cooperation, along with his hope that the inspectors could move very quickly to verify Iraq’s disarmament. We know what happened to that hope. There was no progress on disarmament, and nine months later, the inspectors found it necessary to withdraw.”

Dr. Blix also reminded his audience that UNMOVIC was carrying out its work not only on the basis of Resolution 1441 but also of the earlier Resolution 1284 (1999) which “instructs UNMOVIC to “address unresolved disarmament issues” and to identify “key remaining disarmament tasks” and the latter are to be submitted for approval by the Council in the context of a work programme. UNMOVIC will be ready to submit a draft work programme this month as required. He went on to say that in keeping with the wishes of the Council members the UNMOVIC had prepared a working document on each cluster of disarmament issues and that each document would also indicate the steps that Iraq could take to resolve the issue. “Hence, he said, “Iraq’s cooperation could be measured against the successful resolution of issues.”

This, provided it would seem the basis for the French proposal reiterated in Foreign Minister Villepin’s statement that “First, let us ask the inspectors to establish a hierarchy of tasks for disarmament, and, on that basis, to present us, as quickly as possible, with the work program provided for by Resolution 1284. We need to know immediately which priority issues could constitute the key disarmament tasks to be carried out by Iraq. Secondly, we propose that the inspectors give us a progress report every three weeks. This will make the Iraqi authorities understand that in no case may they interrupt their efforts. And finally, let us establish a schedule for assessing the implementation of the work program. Resolution 1284 provides for a time frame of 120 days. We are willing to shorten it if the inspectors consider it feasible”. In short it would seem that both the inspectors and the opponents of the American position agreed that a period of perhaps two or three months should be granted to the inspection process.

As I have said earlier it appears reasonably certain that those opposed to the use of force to ensure the disarming of Iraq would not agree to this ridiculously short ultimatum. Why was it put forward? First Prime Minister Tony Blair is under extreme pressure from public opinion within the UK. In a bid to retain symmetry with the USA he has already talked of participating in military action even if there is no second resolution or if the resolution is vetoed by more than one country. His Foreign Secretary found himself constrained to distance himself from the objective of the use of force that President Bush has talked about viz. change of regime. President Bush’s spokesman said on March 1 that President Bush was hopeful that war could be averted, but that to escape military action, Iraq must disarm and Mr. Hussein must be deposed. Pressed on the point, Mr. Ari Fleischer said both would be necessary conditions because disarmament was the United Nations’ goal and changing Iraq’s government was the president’s). Foreign Secretary Straw said on March 6 that “We have made it clear, the British prime minister, Tony Blair, has made clear repeatedly, that if Iraq complies with 1441 and disarms of its weapons of mass destruction, we accept that the government of Iraq stays in place. This distancing is important but not enough to placate public opinion and Blair would certainly like the British public to believe that the UK, at least, is making every effort to find a peaceful solution. It is doubtful that this purpose will be served.

Second there may be a hope that this time frame will persuade some non-permanent members to support the resolution or at least abstain from voting rather than opposing it. This may not be as forlorn a hope as it appears on the surface since many of the non-permanent members are apprehensive of having to vote against the United States and may find this sufficient cover to change their position.

Third, admittedly a remote possibility, that President Bush is genuinely interested in a peaceful solution and is suggesting a short time frame backed by the massive military presence in the region to persuade Saddam that his only chance lay in unconditional surrender.

None of the above objectives may be achieved. This does not really matter to the Americans if the driving force behind the timing is military requirements. American military planners have repeatedly stated that they would prefer to launch their air attacks on dark moonless nights. This would mean around the fourth week of February. The Americans are also hoping that in the next few days the Turkish Parliament will reverse its earlier decision and permit the stationing of American assault forces in Turkey. No matter what the Americans have been saying about their ability to go ahead even without Turkish cooperation there is no doubt that there can be no “fast clean operation” without access to Northern Iraq through Turkey. This means that troops will not be positioned in Turkey for another two weeks or so. It would seem that by their planning when the ultimatum expires on March 17 they will allow a week perhaps ten days for the evacuation of the UN inspectors and other foreigners from Iraq and be ready to launch their assault at the time they have already determined to be optimal.

I can only hope that I am wrong and that Bush is genuinely playing a high stakes Poker game and that Saddam will not be stupid enough to try and call his bluff.

The writer is a former foreign secretary

Home | Editorial

Share this story!