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COMMENT: Kerry-Lugar Bill: the army’s objections —Shaukat Qadir

Does no one understand that they can only be strong if they enjoy the support of the people of Pakistan and, if they do, no army can ‘subvert the judicial and political processes’ in Pakistan?

Many analysts in Pakistan find nothing wrong with the Kerry-Lugar (K-L) Bill. Some feel that Pakistan is so desperately in need of assistance that the bill should be accepted at any cost — preconditions or consequences notwithstanding. The President is firmly behind it; the Prime Minister expressed concerned initially, but soon fell in line behind the president. The opposition seems to consider this a golden opportunity to take on the government on its continued submission to the United States at the cost of our sovereignty, and while prepared to tear the government apart on the issue, is carefully refraining from criticising the US.

However, surprisingly, the army, which has been at pains to establish the principle of civilian supremacy, has not only discussed the subject in its annual corps commanders’ conference, but has thereafter issued a public statement to the effect that it “has concerns...the details of which will be conveyed to the government...Pakistan is a sovereign state and has all the rights to analyse and respond to the threat in accordance with its own national interests...in the considered opinion of the forum, it is parliament that would deliberate on the issue to enable the government to develop a national response.”

What does this statement by the army imply?

Obviously, it has reservations about the government’s unconditional acceptance of the bill. It is almost certain that, having conveyed its concerns to General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, during his visit, the army must also have conveyed these to the government, but was dissatisfied with its response and, consequently, decided to express these publicly, without specifying the ‘concerns’.

Moreover, it has publicly implied its dissatisfaction with government policy on this issue and, while announcing its acceptance of the supremacy of parliament, it seeks a ‘national consensus’.

From a totally apolitical, democratic army chief, who has ensured so far that the army visibly stays out of politics and has attempted to erase the view that the army will always have political clout in Pakistan, this is a most unusual and unexpected move. In effect, he has reasserted the army’s political role; knowing him, as I do, there must have been very compelling reasons for him to do so.

Let me state here, unequivocally, that it is the prerogative of any donor country/organisation to monitor and ensure that its donations are spent on what they are intended for. In the case of a country like ours, the issue is compounded by the fact that a) our past record of utilisation of assistance is questionable – Pervez Musharraf’s recent public admissions are a case in point; and b) the current political leadership also has a dubious record which does not inspire confidence.

Having said that, it is also the right of any country not to accept donations with conditions that are unacceptable.

It is also essential to clarify that the K-L Bill is indeed a people-friendly bill intended to assist the people of Pakistan, by helping the government find a way out of the current financial crunch. It is also important to point out that there are no preconditions to the non-military assistance; preconditions apply only to continued ‘security related’ assistance from 2011 to 2014.

However, my first concern is that if the aid is going through USAID and NGOs patronised by the US, the overheads are going to be phenomenal. A modest estimate puts them at 50 percent, which is the sum that will go back to the US as compensation for goods and services provided by US citizens and organisations.

Nonetheless, the question still arises: should that make it acceptable to us, despite the preconditions?

As I read the K-L Bill, I find that it begins with Section 203: LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE. It reads like an indictment in which the complicity of the Pakistan government, the army and the ISI in assisting the Taliban (against ourselves!), not in the past, but today, are a ‘given’ and aid is subject to all three proving their innocence. Guilty until proven innocent!

I also see two preconditions that, in my view could be of concern to the Pakistan Army. First, “the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks”; second, “the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan”.

Not only are both conditions insultingly intrusive, they sound perilously akin to another piece of legislation that was intended to assist Pakistan — the Pressler Amendment. With such preconditions, US assistance can cease at the slightest excuse.

By what right should the American administration, which has traditionally been happier dealing with dictators, take upon itself the right to judge us and to provide “certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the president” that the Pakistan Army is not subverting the “judicial or political processes of Pakistan”?

There is a strong and fairly reliable rumour that certain individuals in the Pakistani political hierarchy, far from being opposed to this precondition, have been actively lobbying in Washington to ensure its inclusion. Some of them, on return, have been gloating of how the K-L Bill would ‘teach the army a lesson’.

Incidentally, Pakistan’s ambassador to the US virtually wrote the text of the K-L Bill in his much-publicised book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, published in 2006. If the former is correct, it would certainly explain why somebody like General Kayani would find it necessary to act in a manner that is the opposite of all that he has endeavoured so hard to stand for.

The PMLN can cry foul as much as they like but, in the post-Kargil scenario, they didn’t act very differently, when Shahbaz Sharif flew to the US to obtain a statement from the then US administration to the effect that the US would not look favourably on a military intervention in Pakistan.

I never cease to be amazed at why our politicians continue to believe that they may be elected by the Pakistani people, but can only continue to hold office with Washington’s approval. No wonder that whoever is in power fails to provide the ‘good governance’ that could ensure his/her re-election and instead continues to kowtow to Washington. Does no one remember Nelson Mandela, Mahatir Mohammed, or even Hugo Chavez?

Does no one understand that they can only be strong if they enjoy the support of the people of Pakistan and, if they do, no army can ‘subvert the judicial and political processes’ in Pakistan? Don’t they understand that by this act they cede even more of our sovereignty to the US than when they permit drone attacks on our soil? The drone attacks, at least, are intended against our common enemy.

Ironically, I feel most sorry for my friend, General Kayani, who has been forced to act in a manner that must be hurting him, more than it hurts me. I am glad that a meeting ground was found domestically. Ironically, had the ‘Note of Clarification’ been the premise of the original bill, I don’t think we would have had any difficulties. As things are, I can only hope.

The writer is a former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Insititute (IPRI)

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