Share this story!            

COMMENT: Independent foreign policy —Munir Attaullah

Is it not now possible — unlike in the Cold War era — to be friendly with the US, China, our Muslim brothers, and even Russia, all at the same time? Defiance of the international community, particularly of the US, is appealingly heroic, but is it in our interest? I know where I stand. You may make up your own mind

For as long as I can remember, the call for an ‘independent foreign policy’ (IFP) has been a vociferous demand in Pakistani politics. That should come as no surprise. Is there any country in the world that does not want to do the same in the exercise of its presumed sovereignty?

I am no expert on geo-strategic matters (or, indeed, on anything else). But I do have more than a layman’s interest in current and international affairs. And, of course, our own foreign policy is of special concern for one very obvious reason. That is because for most countries (even for neighbouring India, and the global power that is the US), though foreign policy is never unimportant, it is their domestic issues and politics that are usually uppermost in the minds both of the people and the government.

On the other hand, for us (and a select few other countries), foreign policy has long been of the utmost importance simply because — for good reasons or bad — we have put ourselves in a position where it has one mighty impact on virtually aspect of our destiny as a nation.

How, and why, has this come about?

For most countries, foreign policy is largely dictated by economic interests. In our case, on the contrary, perceived political interests — particularly our confrontation with India — appear to dwarf all else in the making of foreign policy. Anyway, what should be — in practical terms — the outlines of the IFP, given that different groups mean different things when using the phrase? Is the phrase no more than a euphemism for anti-Americanism?

But first I should state two basic and simple assumptions (with which you may or may not agree) that underpin my thinking. The first is that America is neither our friend nor our enemy. Secondly, I assume our leaders are as patriotic as the next person when it comes to making vital decisions about ‘national interest’. They may be misguided, even hopelessly stupid, but I do not buy the argument that they are prepared to ‘sell out’ and condemn us to American bondage for their personal interest.

If you disagree with either of those two assumptions, don’t waste your time reading further. I learnt a long time ago the futility of rational argument with ideologues.

The foreign policy of countries is based on what their leaders — not their people — perceive to be in their ‘national interest’, though what the people think is (or should be) always an important consideration. We joined the American camp 50 plus years ago because of a convergence of Pakistani and US interests: the Americans got a strategically placed ally in the Cold War, and Pakistan got the financial and military aid it wanted to confront India over Kashmir. But relations soured progressively in the wake of the Sino-Indian conflict that brought the US and India closer, and the disastrous wars of ‘65 and ‘71 when the US not only did not come to our aid but also suspended its assistance.

It was time to formulate an IFP. But note that what this really involved was a search for new patrons to replace the US for the political, financial, and military support we needed. They were duly found in the ‘enemy’ of India and the US (China) and our ‘brothers’ (who we had ignored hitherto) in the newly oil-rich Muslim ummah of the Middle East. As by now we had also embarked on developing the bomb, our differences with the US were substantial.

This broad state of affairs lasted for some three decades, except for the brief few years of the Afghan Jihad. Then came 9/11, and a new phase in Pak-US relations. The initial U-turn may have been ‘forced’ upon us, but today it appears that our government (but not the public) believes there is far more to be gained than lost from close cooperation with the US.

What were our gains and losses as a result of the sort of IFP that alienated a global power?

Sure, we got our bomb; and a steady new source of income through remittances and handouts (though, to benefit from the Middle East oil bonanza, we did not have to alienate the US first).

But what else did we gain?

From the Chinese, as is their way, some discreet advice and restrained diplomatic support, and cooperation and help in defence, but precious little in terms of direct financial aid. But we certainly did not get Kashmir. Indeed, freed from the shackles that required us to pay some attention to international opinion (is that ‘slavery’?), we devised ever more fanciful and dangerous regional strategies to achieve our national objectives.

And what did we lose?

These are contentious and controversial matters that need a book not a column. But the legacy of the drugs, Kalashnikovs and jihadi culture cannot be denied. And a measure of our international isolation as a result of our IFP can be gauged from the fact that, apart from China and the Arab countries, we were largely friendless in the world for most of two decades.

And all that is before I even mention the perilous state of our economy throughout these years because of our IFP. Did we not often flirt with bankruptcy before being bailed out by the IMF? Should I remind you of the government cynically reneging on its sovereign guarantee in the case of the foreign exchange deposits it had solicited? How many remember the fate of the ‘qarz utaro, mulk sanwaro’ scheme? Luckily for us, despite our IFP pretensions, the Americans who control the IMF and other international financial institutions did not shut off such taps.

Of course there were always those who said (and still say), in doing so the sood-khors were only protecting their own interests and that we should go ahead and default, all the consequences be damned. Amazing. If that is not the ultimate of a true IFP, I do not know what is. Unless, that is, we next choose to print our own international reserve currency for trading purposes.

If by now you are a little confused as to what exactly Pakistanis mean by an IFP, I don’t blame you. Incidentally, is Saudi ‘interference’ okay in terms of an IFP, and if so, why? Anyway, can there really be an IFP without complete economic sovereignty first? And how far are we from that situation, in hard terms?

But then maybe I am barking up the wrong tree. For, since when have we, as a ghairatmand qaum, allowed piffling economic considerations to stand in the way of solid political wish fulfilment?

But I will say one thing. It seems to me that our so-called IFP has always been reactive: we look for one only when the US loses interest in us. I give you two examples: if it is in our national interest to shun the US, then why did General Zia-ul Haq eagerly welcome American money and arms, and why was Pervez Musharraf so desperate to have Bill Clinton spend just a few hours in Islamabad on his trip to India? Anyway, in the global village of today, what does an IFP mean?

Is it not now possible — unlike in the Cold War era — to be friendly with the US, China, our Muslim brothers, and even Russia, all at the same time? Defiance of the international community, particularly of the US, is appealingly heroic, but is it in our interest? I know where I stand. You may make up your own mind.

The writer is a businessman. A selection of his columns is now available in book form. Visit munirattaullah.com

Home | Editorial

Share this story!