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Editorial: The Kayani-Shehbaz meeting

The news that the army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, and the Punjab chief minister, Shehbaz Sharif, had a “secret” meeting has not so far been denied by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) department. Reports claim that the PMLN leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, was also present in the meeting.

The PMLN says no such meeting took place. But that denial isn’t worth anything in view of the general lack of credibility of party statements. Given the endemic state of political instability in Pakistan, the news has spread across the borders and the entire world has started to speculate about the meaning and significance of the meeting.

Why should General Kayani feel the need to meet a PMLN leader at this point of time? If he wanted to comment on the political situation in the country, he could have used the channel of the media. There is the constitutional avenue too available to him through which he could have met the president and later allowed the ISPR to ensure that his point of view had been put across. It is also quite possible that General Kayani wanted to take the PMLN on board on the coming offensive in South Waziristan. He may have wanted to remove the army from the attacks that will ensue in the coming days on the PPP government’s support to it. (The Jama’at-e Islami is protesting on the roads; the JUIF from within the coalition is threatening to quit, and some FATA ministers have already resigned.) But in all these cases, he should have approached the government to convey his message.

It is public knowledge that he intervened discreetly during the Long March in favour of the reinstatement of the higher judiciary and prevented it from resulting in a severe security situation. So maybe the meeting was sought by the two PMLN leaders who wanted to convey something secret to him rather than the other way round.

But a “secret” meeting can’t be kept secret in these days of a vigilant media. Therefore any such meeting is only bound to arouse unduly rash speculation in some quarters and fill some others with apprehensions. Above all, by fuelling uncertainty, it will adversely impact the economic sector, forcing investors to postpone their projects till a “final decision about the political situation has been made”. Needless to say, the environment in which the meeting took place was most unsuitable for it. The PPP government is under attack on many fronts but above all it is being pilloried relentlessly by the media for having acquiesced in the harsh “conditionalities” included the American Kerry-Lugar legislation allowing aid to Pakistan. The speculation that General Kayani could have aired his unhappiness with the American aid “conditionalities” — some of which indirectly target the Pakistan Army — is one of the most lethal outcomes of the secret meeting. So more and more people are talking about “mid-term elections” to oust the PPP government before its tenure is over. The meeting, not firmly denied so far by the ISPR, has encouraged those who think that the PPP should be pushed into the wilderness again. The issue of the NRO, brought to the fore once again by the publication of the detailed judgement of the July 31 verdict of the Supreme Court, has also triggered hopes of getting rid of the government.

The fact that Mr Nawaz Sharif is not taking part in the Lahore by-election is also taken as a signal by some for an all-out attempt at the ouster. The official postponement of the deadline for an end to load-shedding in the country has its own destabilising fallout. The aftermath of the meeting is sure to strengthen elements that see their success in political instability. That the meeting was followed by a statement by Mr Shehbaz Sharif condemning the Kerry-Lugar conditionalities has further heated up the situation of political confrontation, amid uncanny, absurd and outrageous rumour-mongering that President Zardari might be scheming to kill Mr Nawaz Sharif!

The sad truth is that every time Gen Kayani makes an intervention like a discreet phone-call or a discreet meeting, the event no longer remains a secret and opens the floodgates of destabilising speculation.

General Kayani has won the gratitude of the nation for staying out of politics in Pakistan. That Pakistan’s politics is negative and based on prejudice rather than opinion, on revenge rather than justice, is true, without the army intervening. But whenever it has in the past it has minimised the chances of things ever getting to normal. The current phase is not ideal, despite the pledges made by politicians before the 2008 elections, but this is the very juncture where the army should let the politicians sort themselves out under the Constitution.

Whatever the reasons, given the situation all round, Gen Kayani erred in secretly meeting with Mr Shahbaz Sharif and Mr Nisar Ali Khan and fuelling unwanted speculation to destabilise the regime and country. And if he didn’t, the ISPR should come out with a robust denial and bury the unhealthy speculation. *

Second Editorial: Nawaz Sharif’s deal with Saudi Arabia

The PMLN has strongly denied that Mr Nawaz Sharif has abstained from contesting the NA-123 by-election in Lahore because the King of Saudi Arabia told him to abstain. The Saudi monarch is reported to have demanded this as part of the “stay away” deal that Mr Sharif struck with him in 2002 as a quid pro quo for his asylum and security. The agreement, despite Mr Sharif’s unbelievable denials, was for ten years but was allowed to be broken after Ms Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan in 2007 on Gen Pervez Musharraf’s watch, the other party to the deal.

The speculation about the deal was stoked when General Musharraf visited Saudi Arabia recently in a plane sent specially by the King and engaged in long discussions with him. After that, Mr Sharif reacted by considerably cooling his party’s rhetoric about getting the PPP government to indict Gen Musharraf for treason.

In the eyes of many, the ten-year deal was between three parties: Mr Sharif, General Musharraf and Saudi Arabia, the third party being the guarantor. General Musharraf can be taken to include the Pakistan Army as was demonstrated by the honours with which he was given a send-off and the discreet advice tendered by the successor army chief to those agitating for death to General Musharraf.

The Saudis relaxed the conditions of the deal when Gen Musharraf allowed Ms Bhutto to return to the country, but the condition of not taking part in politics is supposed to be intact till December 2010. This is incompatible with the way states behave under law but the Saudi connection is known to be special for politicians and the army alike. Mr Sharif was bailed out after the 1998 nuclear test with a generous Saudi subvention in oil; the army is said by many to have a special relationship with Saudi Arabia since 1980 when the Gulf Cooperation Council came into being. *

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