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insight: Defying clarity —Ejaz Haider

There is no Clausewitzean victory in such situations. Bajaur is much more secure than it was a year, even a few months ago. But can we have a coffee shop in Khar bazaar and take spouses and kids for a walk? No

Sometimes, pure logic and neat structures don’t work. Tagore famously said that “A mind all logic is like a knife all blade. It makes the hand bleed that uses it.” He was right.

Such is the nature also of irregular war; and while the mind must apply itself to it logically, there’s nary a possibility of linearity in this business.

Bajaur Agency has seen much destruction and displacement. Of the seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions that constitute the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), it lies in the extreme north and at 1,290 sq km is the smallest agency in terms of area. However, its location is terrible because it abuts the Kunar province of Afghanistan in the northwest and west, the still-troublesome Mohmand Agency in the south, Malakand in the southeast and Dir in the northeast.

The area is inhabited by the two large sub-clans of the Yousafzai tribe, the Utmankhel and the Tarakani. These two sub-clans and their offshoots live in four valleys — Pashat, Mamund, Charmang and Nawagai. Kunar is linked with it through four passes — Letai, Kaga, Fazal and Nawa — that run north to south in this order. These passes and countless other crossing points and trails make the Agency prone to infiltration. The fact that Kunar remains restive doesn’t help.

When the government decided to launch an operation in Bajaur on September 4, 2008, the situation in the area had become almost impossible. The fighting had started on August 6 when the Taliban attacked a convoy of Frontier Corps and army troops near Loesam. While their positions were pounded by artillery, Cobra gunships and aircraft, on the ground there were unacceptable gains by the Taliban. They killed 16 troops in the convoy ambush, captured some 24 and besieged 80 Bajaur Scouts in the Loesam area.

This was not unexpected. The situation, over the years, was developing towards this end. The Taliban had acquired virtual control of the area and ran a parallel administration. A large number of Afghan fighters had been steadily entering Bajaur from Kunar and linking up with the Pakistani Taliban led by Faqir Muhammad. Faqir, a Mamund Tarakani from the Mamund tehsil, initially led the Tehreek Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi after the arrest of Sufi Muhammad. In December 2007, he merged his fighters with the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and became the TTP’s now-killed leader Baitullah Mehsud’s second-in-command.

Faqir was also suspected of harbouring Ayman Al Zawahiri and saw at least two Predator strikes at safe houses run by him in Damadola, his hometown. At least one killed many civilians, including children. He was being assisted by Taliban commanders Ali Rehman, Jan Wali alias Sheena and Maulvi Said Muhammad, also known as Maulvi Umar.

Much is made of the peace agreements with some analysts blaming the government for their failure. The fact is that even when the militants wanted the government to cease fire, as happened in late October after the government launched Operation Sherdil (Lionheart) on September 4, 2008 and cleared the area up to Loesam, they made demands (enforcement of sharia law, for instance) which would give them a big share in the administrative/governance pie.

Moreover, most of these peace overtures came when the government used force and pressed its advantage. Take, for instance, the sequence of events in Bajaur after the induction in Torghundi of 26 Brigade.

The brigade was tasked with securing the area up to Khar, which it did in four days and linked up with elements from Bajaur Scouts. The security forces then advanced in a day up to Rashakai. Medium artillery, tanks and gunships were used along with the ground offensive. Beyond this point the advance faced stiff resistance at Tangkhata, Nisarabad and Rashakai. It took the forces almost a month-and-half before they could secure the area up to Loesam, which they did by October 23.

The forces then pushed further towards Zorbandar and cleared the area by November 30 and established link-up with 1 Wing of Bajaur Scouts by December 2.

At another axis, northwest from Khar bazaar towards Inayat Qilla, 5 Wing of Khyber Rifles secured the area up to Inayat Qilla’s FC fort by February 6 this year. By the next day, 3 Wing of Swat Scouts had reached the Bypass. Later that month, 4 Wing Bajaur Scouts had captured Bai China in a surprise attack.

A year after the various battles fought in and around the area, including in Inayat Qilla and from Khar bazaar to Loesam, the signs of destruction are clear. The area looks hauntingly quiet; whatever buildings remain standing are either partially destroyed or have telltale bullet and rocket-strike marks on every wall.

But it was the sustained push, absent until then, which signalled to the entrenched Taliban that the government meant business. While they inflicted losses, at times heavy, on the security forces, their own losses were becoming prohibitive.

They also faced a dilemma. By entrenching themselves in the area, despite impressive defensive positions, they had rendered themselves vulnerable to indirect artillery and direct tank fire from the ground and strikes from aerial platforms.

One thing was clear to me, being on the ground. If the security forces did not have the advantage of aerial platforms and if they had to attack Taliban positions from the ground without suppression fire or close air support which destroyed the Taliban defensive positions or softened them, the number of casualties would have been unacceptably high.

One brigade and elements from Bajaur, Dir and Swat Scouts and Khyber Rifles would not have been enough. And while it is a safe bet that ultimately the security forces would have cleared the area, the fighting, small arms to small arms, would have been bloodier and the cost for the attacker much higher.

The Taliban were well-armed, well-trained and highly motivated. Apart from small arms and light weapons, they were using RRs (recoilless rifles — which can be used in anti-tank, anti-vehicle and anti-personnel roles), SBRLs (single barrel rocket launchers), mortars, RPG-7s etc. It was formidable weaponry to counter armour and infantry assaults on defensive positions both in built-up areas on flat ground (converted into networked defensive positions) and on the low ridges towards the northwest of the axis of advance from Khar to Loesam.

By October 30, therefore, Faqir Muhammad offered to lay down arms and informed the government through a jirga that the Taliban would dismantle their infrastructure and help restore the writ of the state. If the government had fallen for that without clearing up the main defensive positions, the breather would have given the Taliban time to reorganise, regroup and replenish their diminished supplies.

Jaw-jaw is important in this kind of war but the timing has to be right and quite often, as in this case, jaw-jaw and war-war go together. To think that one can dialogue from a position of weakness is to invite trouble.

So, has Bajaur been secured?

It depends on how one defines success in irregular war. There is no Clausewitzean victory in such situations. Bajaur is much more secure than it was a year, even a few months ago. But can we have a coffee shop in Khar bazaar and take spouses and kids for a walk? No.

There is danger lurking out there constantly, and despite patrolling. Having lost control of the territory the Taliban have, paradoxically, gained the traditional advantage of guerrilla fighters: the twin elements of surprise and mobility. The government has denied them the advantage of turning Bajaur into an independent fief run by the TTP. But those who melted away are now at large. They can hunker down, wait patiently and strike when the opportunity presents itself. And aside from conducting ambushes and occasional raids on outposts, there is always the suicide bomber.

While the government has regained control of the roads and communication centres, movement remains dangerous and lowering the guard can invite trouble. Patrolling takes its toll on the nerves of security personnel who have to remain alert every moment because any laxity means paying the cost in blood.

The stabilisation and rehab processes are going on in Lower Dir and Malakand. That should help Bajaur, just as keeping Bajaur under control is important for stabilisation in Lower Dir and Malakand. But Mohmand Agency in the south remains restive, as do parts of Khyber, further south of Mohmand. While it is shorter to go to Bajaur from Peshawar via Mohmand, that route is not taken unless one is heavily escorted and can travel when the sun is still out. Instead, one has to go right up to Batkhela and then turn west and go northwest to Timargara before proceeding on to Bajaur — a much longer route.

Defining victory is important because expectations must be kept low. This is true not just of Bajaur but of other Agencies too and, in general, of the very nature of this conflict where zones of war and peace continue to overlap.

What a luxury it was to fight well-defined inter-state wars. Writing his The Conduct of War, Maj.-Gen JFC Fuller fulminated against the death of aristocracies and the rise of democracies and national armies a la Napoleon’s. Wonder what he would say about the war among the people which defies clarity on all counts.

Ejaz Haider is op-ed editor of Daily Times, consulting editor of The Friday Times and host of Samaa TV’s programme “Siyasiyat”. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

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