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view: Learning the wrong lessons —Chalinda Weerasinghe

Make no mistake, neither Sri Lanka nor Pakistan faces purely a military threat. Although there is much discussion that the military is only part of the solution, there is no indication that any other aspect of the solution is being considered seriously

Just as the Pakistani military advances towards the Taliban stronghold in South Waziristan, the Sri Lankan Army is busy celebrating its military victory against the LTTE. The Sri Lankan experience contains a number of pertinent lessons for the Pakistani authorities. These lessons must be heeded if Pakistan is to retain its democratic and moderate values and institutions.

I wish to point to the negative aspects of the Lankan experience to illustrate the potential pitfalls Pakistan must guard against.

Amidst the euphoria in Sri Lanka over the perceived end to the LTTE menace, we must not forget that Sri Lanka’s ‘victory’ has come at an unacceptable price. I am not even sure if it can be called a victory. There are no indications that the root causes of the Sri Lankan conflict are being addressed and political realities are in fact nudging the government to see the military victory as an end-game.

Sri Lanka has had a lamentable past. It degenerated into an illiberal quasi-police state where successive governments (the present one included) have engaged in overt and covert intimidation of dissidents, journalists and human rights workers, and dismantled the independent judicial system in the name of ‘national interest’. They carried out extra-judicial killings and torture, conducted human rights violations, and suppressed all forms of dissent. Communal fires were stoked and civil liberties were suspended for the most part; Colombo became a prime example of majoritarianism gone wrong.

It is in light of this context that we need to understand the current victory against the LTTE. The present administration is led by ultra-right nationalists who were, for the first time since Tamil militant uprisings, as hard-line and resolute as the terrorists they were fighting. This fact, coupled with new strategic and tactical operational expertise, enabled the government to achieve a military victory that had eluded its predecessors.

In doing so, however, they went to unprecedented lengths to control the general population and generate support for the war. They also showed callous disregard for Tamil civilian lives, epitomised by their behaviour towards the end of the war. They did not possess a plan for a lasting political solution to the problem after the military victory.

The reason Velupillai Prabhakaran’s ruthlessness did not dent his hold on his people is that his aspirations were widely shared by Tamils when the militant movement first started gaining traction in Sri Lanka. The LTTE wanted a separate homeland but also at times advocated a federal solution to solve the conflict. Neither of these demands were seriously discussed and entertained by successive governments.

As in the 1950s, when the seeds of the conflict were first sown, nationalist parties are the driving force in the current government and they have always maintained that Sri Lanka is a Sinhalese country above all. Even the army has made similar comments.

Quite worrisome is the fact that talks of more autonomy to the Tamils in the wake of the military victory over the LTTE have been shot down by those sympathetic to the government and its nationalist proponents. The government has already ruled out the LTTE as a negotiating partner in a peace process but there is no viable independent Tamil party or voice to articulate the needs of the Tamils.

The only Tamil parties are beholden to the majority Sinhalese-led political parties for survival. Hence, there is little reason to be optimistic that a lasting, satisfactory political solution is forthcoming from this administration.

The discriminatory practices of subsequent Sri Lankan governments aided the LTTE and other radical groups in their recruitment and mobilisation. These terrorist groups tapped into the marginalisation felt by the Tamil community in the north and the east of the country. Likewise, although the Taliban “are not reflecting Pashtun or Swati aspirations”, they are tapping into the resentment and marginalisation felt by these groups — economic, political and otherwise.

Amidst waves of suicide bombings and indiscriminate violence orchestrated by Tamil groups in Sri Lanka, the people turned a blind eye to the extreme measures undertaken by the government. There is evidence that Pakistanis are similarly desperate. Articles in the Pakistani press have been exhorting Pakistanis to accept “collateral damage”, just as Sri Lankans were repeatedly told to do (which they did with little opposition) through the years by their leaders.

Therefore, should Pakistan emulate Sri Lanka and lose its way by resorting to terrorism, intimidation and tyranny to fight an enemy who poses an existential threat to the state?

Certainly not. Once you go down the path that Sri Lanka embarked on, there is very little room to turn back. Institutions, precedence and incentives will take hold such that illiberal, tyrannical tendencies will be reinforced.

No state should resort to terrorism to defeat terrorists. They should not disregard human rights and violate conventions and norms regarding non-combatants and refugees. They should not deny civil liberties to their own people, curtail and censor the free media, suppress dissension and violate judicial independence.

The Pakistani Army so far seems to have taken great care in reducing collateral damage. Yet there are signs that no concrete plan exists for dealing with the massive IDP presence. No permanent socio-political solution has been debated. There are no plans on how to incorporate amenable Taliban foot soldiers into the mainstream.

Make no mistake, neither Sri Lanka nor Pakistan faces purely a military threat. Although there is much discussion that the military is only part of the solution, there is no indication that any other aspect of the solution is being considered seriously.

Pakistan needs to see the Taliban threat as a governance problem. Simultaneous efforts must be initiated to deal with the real reasons behind the disaffection of a large number of people in the country. On the military front, fighting a war with a conscience and restraint will only make it easier to bring disaffected citizens back into the mainstream.

Chalinda Weerasinghe is a political economist at the University of Maryland, College Park. He wrote this article exclusively for Daily Times

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