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ANALYSIS: Swat to South Waziristan —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

It seems that the army is currently blocking exit points from South Waziristan into other tribal areas and the NWFP so that the Taliban do not easily slip out of the region. This is being coupled with air raids and limited ground offensives using heavy guns on selected targets

The current phase of the security operation in Swat involving direct encounters between the army and the Taliban is nearing completion. The army and paramilitary forces have cleared the cities and main roads of the Taliban, who have been killed, arrested or have fled the area. They have also been dislodged from Buner and Dir.

The army will have to stay in these areas for a year or so to help the civilian administration restore basic civic facilities and to facilitate the return of the population that left the area at the beginning of the operation. They will have to maintain tight security to ensure that the remnants of the Taliban do not regroup and launch attacks. It is understandable that the government has decided to set up an army cantonment in Swat so that some troops are permanently present there.

The dislodging of the Taliban from the Swat-Malakand area reassures the people that the army has the capacity to cope with the Taliban challenge and enhances their confidence in the army. However, the Taliban menace cannot be effectively controlled without dismantling its authority structure in the tribal areas, especially South Waziristan, where they have established their main base. The army has already launched an operation in Bannu and has made initial punitive moves in South Waziristan to build pressure on Baitullah Mehsud and his Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan.

The security operation in South Waziristan is going to be a more challenging affair than the Swat action, because the TTP main base is said to be fortified with a strong presence of foreign fighters, including some Al Qaeda elements. The TTP is expected to use tough guerrilla tactics, including suicide attacks in mainland Pakistan through its linkages with local militant/sectarian groups in Punjab. Al Qaeda’s disposition will also influence the situation in South Waziristan. It is difficult to suggest if Al Qaeda will stay neutral or support the TTP.

Security forces have to cover a large area and the Taliban have the option of moving to another agency or cross over to Afghanistan. Another possibility is that the Afghan Taliban may join Pakistani Taliban in their war against Pakistan.

Pakistan and US/NATO troops need to improve coordination to interdict cross-border movement of people and weapons. Such coordination also serves American security interests in Afghanistan. The US is currently sending fresh troops to Afghanistan that are expected to launch a major security operation in July-August in order to ensure a peaceful presidential election in Afghanistan on August 20. The American operation in Afghanistan can cause cross-border movement of Afghan Taliban to the Pakistani tribal areas, adding to Pakistan’s security problems there. This will compromise the effectiveness of American military operations in Afghanistan. Therefore, both Pakistan and the US need to restrict cross-border movement in the next three months for their individual considerations.

It seems that the army is currently blocking exit points from South Waziristan into other tribal areas and the NWFP so that the Taliban do not easily slip out of the region. This is being coupled with air raids and limited ground offensives using heavy guns on selected targets. The air and ground offensive is expected to pick up pace soon, followed by induction of troops into the area, involving direct encounters with the fighters of Baitullah Mehsud.

Four major factors are in favour of the civilian government and the army. First, the dislodging of the Taliban from Swat and adjoining areas is a morale booster for the security forces and the provincial and federal governments. For the first time the civilian government and the army have pursued counter-insurgency single-mindedly and persistently. The army was not deterred by the human losses it suffered in Swat. The top commanders appear fully determined to move decisively against the Taliban and their allied groups.

Second, anti-Taliban sentiments have increased in Pakistan during the last three months. This shift has been caused mainly by stepped up violence in different cities by the TTP and its allied groups based in the Punjab, starting with the March 3 attack on Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore. Other immediate factors are the efforts of the Taliban to expand their control after the agreement between the NWFP government and Sufi Muhammad, and stories of the brutalities the Taliban inflicted on the people.

The Taliban continue to enjoy some support from Islamist political parties, especially the Jama’at-e Islami, which is engaged in a persistent campaign against the on-going security operation in Swat and opposes any operation in the tribal areas. Most Deobandi/Wahhabi religious leaders express support or sympathy for the Taliban. Barelvi religious leaders invariably support the military operation against the Taliban.

This religious-sectarian divide has become sharper after the assassination of Maulana Naeemi in Lahore, a cleric belonging to the Barelvi Islamic tradition, on June 12. The alienated Barelvi religious leaders are now more vocal in criticising the Taliban, especially suicide attacks. Shia religious leaders are also opposed to the Taliban and their violence against Pakistani state and society. These developments have weakened Taliban support even within Islamic circles.

Third, the military authorities need to exploit the contradictions between Baitullah Mehsud, chief of the TTP, and other militant and tribal leaders that have surfaced this week. Baitullah Mehsud established his control first in the Waziristan area by 2007 after ruthlessly subduing other commanders and tribal leaders who questioned his leadership or methods. Some of these commanders have now declared their opposition to Baitullah.

Two important commanders — Qari Zainuddin and Haji Turkistan — have publicly denounced Baitullah and his violent tactics. More such leaders will surface in the near future, who can be cultivated by Pakistani authorities. Their support will be useful but the Pakistan Army will have to take on Baitullah and his fighters militarily to dislodge them.

Fourth, the recent arrest of some militants in Punjab, accused of involvement in the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team, is a helpful development. If the police and other security personnel contain local militants (‘Punjabi Taliban’), it would vastly reduce Baitullah’s capacity to launch suicide attacks in the cities because he functions in mainland Pakistan though local Islamic extremists and militant-sectarian groups.

These factors have created a favourable environment for a new security operation. Civilian and military authorities are better placed now to move against the TTP. However, this operation could be a long one. The government should make it clear that the security operation does not target the Mehsud tribe but Baitullah and his Pakistani and foreign associates that have established their reign of terror in the tribal areas and sponsor terrorist attacks in mainland Pakistan.

Authorities should not be oblivious to humanitarian issues caused by insurgency and counter-insurgency. The influx of refugees from Swat and adjoining areas is a case in point. A similar problem can arise when a major operation is launched in the tribal areas.

Decisive action in South Waziristan and other tribal areas is a pre-requisite rehabilitating the writ of the Pakistani state and restoring the confidence of the people of Pakistan and the international community in the capacity and determination of the civilian government and especially the military to cope with the Taliban groups. This would also demoralise militant groups in mainland Pakistan.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

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