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EDITORIAL: Pakistan, China and the web of foreign policy moves

General Pervez Musharraf wants even closer ties with China. This presents an interesting perspective on foreign policy. Consider.

The political opposition leaves no opportunity to castigate General Pervez Musharraf and his government for allying with the United States. Firebrands from the Left to the Right say General Musharraf is doing the dirty job of the Americans. The not-so-hidden suggestion is that he should have told the Americans to take a hike, stood by the Taliban and even supported Al Qaeda in the face of world pressure. This is as simplistic as any analysis of foreign policy can get. But what would the critics make of General Musharraf’s attempt, as we have just noted, to forge even closer ties with China, which is presumably the power that will rise to challenge the US and with which the neo-conservative cabal in the US wants a confrontation.

This suggests that foreign policy is not a simple, linear affair; that Pakistan, living as it does in a tough neighbourhood, needs to reach out to multiple players and may well be doing exactly that. One corollary of this is that while theory may deal with alliances and opposition in hermetic and dichotomous terms, branding one as bandwagoning and the other as balancing, enmeshing the two concepts is realpolitik. The US, like India, is also concerned about China’s presence in Gwadar, which overlooks one of the most crucial SLOCs (sea lanes of communication). Now General Musharraf wants a railway link with China and an energy grid that places Pakistan strategically as the transit route for these pipelines. This is what he means when he points to Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis West, Central and South Asia as well as Southeast Asia.

This is as far as another dimension of foreign policy is concerned and which those who criticise Pakistan’s US policy would do good to consider. But Islamabad itself needs to consider the viability of some of the plans.

It makes absolute sense to get the Chinese to invest in Pakistan. But it is equally vital to have a broad base of investors from various countries. This is important because there should be no monopolies and because more players give Pakistan a leverage which it may lose if it relies too much on any single country. Already, we have seen a sudden rush of Dubai-based companies into Pakistan. Moreover, businessmen point out that Pakistan may be ignoring certain “excesses” by Chinese companies because Islamabad has a strategic partnership with Beijing and that part of the relationship is crucial for the former.

The second aspect deals with projections about pipelines. There are supposed to be three potential pipelines in the pipeline: Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI), Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and India (TAP or TAPI) and Qatar-Pakistan or GUSA (Gulf-South Asia). It is now amply clear that the US is opposed to IPI. India is playing all sides and keeping the issue open. Pakistan says it wants it and may even sign a bilateral MOU with Iran to that effect. But that doesn’t mean that the project is on because without India on board and without a nod or wink from the US no foreign investor will put a dime in it.

As for TAP, the truth is that there are not enough gas reserves left in Turkmenistan to warrant a big pipeline to Pakistan and India. Much the same is true of GUSA, which energy experts say Pakistan missed out on earlier by pinning its hopes on the other two. The US has now opened up another project for evaluation as an alternative to these gas projects — an electricity grid from Kazakhistan and Tajikistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. But even that will depend on stability in the transit areas which is not on the cards in the short term at least.

So we come back to the IPI or perhaps IP. Apart from the political obstacles in the way of the project, there are technical and economic issues too. Senator Mushahid Hussain told a London-based TV channel that the issue hung on the pricing factor. The Iranians reportedly want the gas price to be pegged to the oil price. Their reasoning is that gas is being consumed at a much faster pace and now even used in vehicles and therefore it must be priced higher. The problem is that if Tehran sticks to its stance on pricing, Pakistan and India will not be able to afford it. The only way to get cheap gas is to tap domestic resources. But they may lie in Balochistan, a province which is restive and difficult to unlock. That is where the real long term challenge lies.

The point that we are trying to make is that it is a complex situation with wheels within wheels. Dealing with multiple players means weaving a complex web of moves and counter-moves. However, it should be clear that every policy has its downside. It is important to reach out to China and even woo Chinese businessmen but it is equally important to also balance China. Similarly, it is well to talk about an energy grid but equally important to make realistic projections. At the least Islamabad should come up with specific data on the various pipelines and discuss their economic and political feasibility in the next five to ten years. This is important because it will help clear the picture in terms of what the options are and how well — if at all — they can be exercised. *

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