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Musharraf seeking independent foreign policy

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: President General Pervez Musharraf has sought to chart an independent foreign policy by defying the United States and pursuing talks with Iran on the construction of a pipeline to allow the export of gas to India and Pakistan, according to a new study.

This is one of the conclusions reached by the study completed by Owen Bennett Jones of the BBC and Dr Farzana Shaikh of the Pakistan Study Group, which works under the aegis of the Asia Programme at Chatham House, London.

The authors maintain that since 9/11 General Musharraf has been caught between the Bush “war on terror” and Pakistan’s pro-Islamic parties. Despite an improving economy with American help, the country faces difficult choices. Continuing unrest in Afghanistan and the slow pace of the composite dialogue with India could result in growing opposition from groups unwilling to accept any weakening of Pakistan’s influence in the region or shift in the conduct of its regional policy.

The Pakistani military leader, mindful of these risks, has broadened his foreign policy options. “Despite the improving relations between Beijing and Delhi, Musharraf is determined to keep Pakistan’s status as China’s closest ally in the region. This is partly an attempt to recast Pakistan’s relations with the United States along more independent lines,” the two authors write. They also consider the decision to reach out to Israel as part of that drive.

Jones and Shaikh argue that General Musharraf tough choices in the wake of major international developments and shifts within the South Asian region since 9/11 could determine the very survival of his regime. While it is clear that his staying power depends upon a close

alliance with the United States in the “war on terror,” he cannot afford to abandon his support for militant groups in Kashmir without risking his political credibility and possibly his personal safety at home. However, attempts by the United States to strengthen India’s position as the main regional power in South Asia have prompted Gen. Musharraf to try to steer a more independent foreign policy predicated on strengthening ties with other major powers, especially China, refusing to surrender influence in Afghanistan and boldly initiating contacts with Israel. The aim is to pacify critics at home without endangering his international standing as the champion of “enlightened moderation.”

The two authors take the view that General Musharraf’s problems are more complex than those faced by General Ziaul Haq in that India is now an ally of the United States, unlike those days when it leaned towards Moscow. India’s growing economic might has regional implications. China’s long-standing hostility to India is being transformed by Beijing’s and Delhi’s mutual interest in improving their trading and wider bilateral relations. The rising costs of the Kashmir dispute have induced Pakistan to try to reach an agreement on its solution. However, India has shown no sign of reciprocating the various options initiated by General Musharraf. Consequently, the chances of the peace process succeeding are slim.

An economically more stable Pakistan, Jones and Shaikh believe, has increased the international legitimacy of the Musharraf regime. He has projected his government as the only reliable defence against a fundamentalist takeover in Pakistan. The two authors point out that the Pakistan army has not gone as far as breaking completely with the Pakistan-based Kashmiri militant groups. Some US policy-makers argue that the continued support for these groups will backfire on Pakistan because the militants will not restrict their activities to Kashmir. Pakistan’s influence in Kabul, they write, has declined sharply since the overthrow of the Taliban. Pakistan’s coddling of Taliban elements may spring from its calculation that, in the future this may give Islamabad the chance of once again having a friendly government in Kabul.

The authors state that the benefits to Pakistan of the Iran gas pipeline to India would be great. The pipeline would secure some of Pakistan’s own supply needs; secondly, Islamabad would receive transit fees and taxes worth $9 billion over the first 30 years; thirdly, the pipeline would give Pakistan some control over India’s energy supply and help ensure its involvement in a potentially troublesome relationship between Tehran and Delhi. Pakistan and Iran have conflicting interests in Afghanistan and Islamabad fears Iran’s capacity to sponsor sectarian violence in Pakistan. Pakistan has said that it would like to go ahead with the project despite American opposition.

On Kashmir, Jones and Shaikh maintain, General Musharraf has enjoyed far more room for manoeuvre than any civilian-led government. However, the issue of what India calls “cross-border terrorism,” remains a major obstacle to a peace settlement. Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri militant groups has been severely constrained since 9/11. The Kashmiri militancy has a popular support base in Pakistan. They write, “It is clear that Pakistan has made important concessions on Kashmir … By contrast, India appears to have given little in return to Pakistan beyond engagement in an open-ended process of ‘substantive dialogue’. In reality, of course, neither side has honoured its commitments. Pakistan has, from time to time, allowed infiltrations across the LOC to resume while India has not yet come close to making an offer on Kashmir that would allow General Musharraf to sell a settlement to the army, the Pakistani people and to Kashmiri militant leaders. The absence of any movement on the part of India, publicly at least, could also mean that prospects for a significant breakthrough in the short to medium term are likely to remain slim.”

Jones and Shaikh write that Islamabad’s status as a key ally of Washington, coupled with a thaw in contacts between India and China, have put unprecedented strain on Pak-China relations. Beijing is concerned not only by Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States over Afghanistan but also by reports that the US has been granted permission to establish listening posts in Pakistan’s Northern Areas bordering the western Chinese province of Xinjiang and Tibet. There are unconfirmed reports indicate that Pakistan is considering the purchase of up to half a dozen nuclear reactors worth $10 billion from China.

According to the two authors, “Among Musharraf’s boldest foreign policy moves was the decision in 2005 publicly to open diplomatic talks with Israel. Although it is known that both countries had informally pursued relations since the late 1980s, no government until now has been willing to confront an Islamist backlash on this issue. The impact of this opening to Tel Aviv on the Islamic world cannot yet be determined. Iran is said to take a dim view of this rapprochement, fearing that with Iraq brought to its knees, Israel has now set its sights on containing Iran’s regional ambitions with the help of Pakistan. These fears may be unfounded, although Pakistan has long viewed Iran’s regional ambitions with suspicion.

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